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**JAPANESE POSTWAR DEFENSE AND
SECURITY POLICY**

PATRICK H. ROTH

1978

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JAPANESE POSTWAR DEFENSE AND SECURITY POLICY

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of
Requirements for the Degree of Master
of Public Administration

T150

Prepared by

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May, 1972

Epilogue March, 1973

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INTRODUCTION

A little over a quarter century ago, Japan lay devastated. Her cities and factories were wasted, her shipping was on the bottom of the sea and a foreign conqueror occupied what was left. Today, Japan's gross national product ranks third in the world and, if we are to believe some experts, will eventually rank first. Her cities have been rebuilt, her factories are among the most modern and productive in the world and her ubiquitous presence is seen in every harbor in the world.

It has been a commonplace of history that a country with such great economic strength has formulated policies to defend and expand its interests and marshaled armies to support these policies. Post World War II Japan, in the middle part of this century, has done none of these things. She has not formulated a coherent policy defining the issues between her and her neighbors on the Pacific East Asian rim. Many issues arising out of the World War remain unresolved. And, as of 1970, her armed forces ranked 22nd in size behind such countries as Italy and Spain.

The purpose of this paper then is to seek some of the answers behind the paradox of great economic power without an apparent defense and security policy commensurate with its visible interests.

Before discussing Japan's defense and security policy, it is necessary to outline the nature of her policy-making process. The Occupation-inspired Constitution of 1947 established the Diet (Parliament) as the highest organ of state power and vested executive power in the Cabinet. With the exception of a brief period during the Occupation, the conservatives have continuously maintained an absolute majority in the Diet. They have thus maintained

control of the executive and legislative function of government. Opposition parties have never threatened this solidly entrenched majority. This has led to a description of the Japanese parliamentary system as a "one-and-one-half-party system. One party remains dominant and always in power. It knows only how to govern. The other is a perennial minority, unable to command more than one third of the electorate. It knows only how to oppose, and at times seems positively afraid of power."¹

With no effective parliamentary constraints to decision-making, the locus of the Japanese policy decision-making process then is to be found in the conservative party. Structurally, the party is a collection of factional alliances built around individuals.² This leads to a certain instability. Decisions must be made with an eye to the needs and requirements of maintaining a coalition of factions sufficient to ensure continued party control. The Prime Minister, head of the party and the government, must consider the impact of policy decision on his own factional coalition and on the strength of the "anti-mainstream" factions within the party who are trying to better their positions within the party structure. "The intraparty decision-making process of the conservatives . . . (thus becomes) the most important single factor of Japanese politics exerting influence on foreign policy."³

The history of Japan's defense and security policy is then the history of the conservative party position. Policy positions taken by opposition parties are generally in opposition to the conservative position.

¹Robert A. Scalapino, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962), p. 53.

²Ibid., p. 54.

³Donald C. Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), p. 14.

The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) is the largest opposition party. The Socialists generally favor peaceful diplomacy based upon the principle of "unarmed neutrality." They favor recognition of Communist China, an ambiguous position on Korea and, while they favored normalization of relations with the Soviets, they took a hard line on territorial concessions. If followed, their position would lead to a renunciation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and reduction in the size of the armed forces.

The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), an offshoot of the JSP, favors a policy that on the surface is not much different than that of the conservatives. The DSP supports the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty but would withdraw U.S. troops and bases from Japan. It has supported normalization of relations with South Korea and favors normalization of relations with China without breaking ties with Taiwan.

Komeito, the political arm of the Buddhist Value Creation Society, advocates a utopian "perfect neutrality" which would be achieved by a policy of "cosmopolitic nationalism" in foreign affairs. Japan, in their world, would fashion a policy of harmony with everyone and phase out the Japan-U.S. security system. Her armed forces would be absorbed by the United Nations peace keeping forces.

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) naturally favors normalization of relations with the socialist states and abrogation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. At the moment, they are at odds with both Moscow and Peking in the world communist movement.⁴

All of these policy positions have made little impact on the conservative governments of Japan. What then is Japan's defense and security policy?

⁴ Contemporary Japan, XXIX, No. 2 (March 1970) contains an excellent presentation of security policy stands by spokesmen for the various Japanese political parties.

OCCUPATION: 1945-1952

Unnatural Security

Japan accepted as a condition for surrender the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. These terms included the directive that Japan's military forces would be "completely disarmed" and that Japan would be prescribed from maintaining industries that "would enable her to re-arm for war."¹ The country was to be occupied until the allies were satisfied that this was accomplished. As stated in the Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to the Occupation authorities, "the ultimate objective of the United Nations with respect to Japan is to foster conditions which will give the greatest possible assurance that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world . . ."²

The Occupation authorities under General MacArthur vigorously pursued these objectives. Japan's armed forces were quickly disbanded and wartime leaders purged. All defense-related industries were destroyed, shipped out of the country as repatriations or converted to other uses. The allied powers, specifically the United States, assumed in fact if not in law responsibility for the defense and security of Japan. Diplomatic contact with the rest of the world was curtailed.

The Occupation authorities considered constitutional revision essential in order to provide safeguards against a revival of Japanese militarism. This desire was conveyed to the Japanese government, and it was made known that they were expected to come up with a new constitution. Initial

¹SCAP Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan September 1945 to September 1948 (Washington, n.d.), p. 413.

²Ibid., p. 429.

Japanese proposals proved unacceptable to General MacArthur, and on February 3, 1946, he directed the Chief of the Government Section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Courtney Whitney, to prepare a draft constitution. MacArthur's memorandum on the subject noted that he desired the following point be incorporated:

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished.
Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling
its disputes and even for preserving its own security.
It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring
the world for its defense and its protection.

No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force.³

These principles were incorporated in the Government Section draft constitution.⁴

As a results, in its final form Chapter II of the 1947 Constitution states:

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.⁵

³ Ibid., p. 102.

⁴ It appears that this permanent prohibition of armed forces was not advocated by the U.S. State Department, Japanese Government officials, The Far Eastern Commission or the U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. MacArthur attributes it to a suggestion by Japanese Prime Minister Shidehara. However, MacArthur probably insisted upon it in order to make retention of the Emperor system acceptable to allied opinion. A detailed discussion of this question is contained in Theodore McNelly, "The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVII, No. 3 (September 1962), pp. 350-378.

⁵ SCAP, p. 671.

This article represents a departure from the original draft submitted to the Japanese and from initial Japanese drafts. During the Diet hearings considering the new constitution, Ashida Hitoshi (Prime Minister from March to October 1948) offered an ammendment to the article which was accepted by the Japanese and approved by SCAP Government Section.

Ashida's ammendment modified the language by inserting the phrases "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order" and "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph." Ashida later explained that this conditional phraseology was inserted in order to make it possible for Japan to rearm for self defense.⁶

The constitutional prohibition of "war" was not the only reform which was to have an effect on Japanese thinking on security matters. Occupation authorities also had the Japanese Government remove all restraints on political parties. Among the parties that reemerged was the Japan Communist Party. In addition, SCAP, operating under the Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive, had encouraged labor movement, especially critical transportation, communications and electrical power unions. Labor, as a consequence, became quite active during the period.

The Japanese Government, handicapped by Occupation-imposed dissolution of national control of the police, saw potential economic and social chaos as a distinct possibility. In fact, threat of a nationwide general strike was averted during the Occupation period only by direct SCAP intervention. This threat of internal chaos and the "no war" clause in the Constitution were to play a role in the Japanese decisions on issues of defense and security.

⁶ McNelly, "Renunciation of War," p. 370.

Origins of Defense and Security Policy

Postwar Japan's most pressing problem would be finding a way for Japan to exist as an independent political entity after the Occupation ended. Early postwar Japanese governments were quick to size up the emerging cold war tensions and shifted their thinking from projected reactions to a peace treaty based on the terms of the Potsdam Declaration to the possibility of one based on the new emerging bipolar world. They could see the growing ineffectiveness of the Far East Commission and Allied Council under the strain of cold war ideology and "as U.S.-Soviet relations became ever more strained. . . (the Japanese Government) could sense that the American view was changing to that of the need to guarantee Japanese security as a part of world security."¹

During 1947, a number of proposals were made by U.S. authorities suggesting that the time was ripe for the conclusion of peace with Japan. Consequently, informal talks began with U.S. representatives discussing the possible peace treaty and the related question of security. In response to a suggestion by George Atcheson, State Department representative in Japan, that it was quite possible that the United States might refer the question of guaranteeing Japan's security to the United Nations, the Japanese replied to the effect that "unless the organisation (sic) of the United Nations was one upon which absolute reliance could be placed, there did not seem to be any way for Japan to defend herself against foreign invasion except by an alliance with a third Power."² In this regard, then Prime

¹ Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs (Boston, 1962) p. 264.

² Ibid., p. 264.

Minister Yoshida noted: "our own ideas began to tend in the direction of having the United States reinforce our defences, rather than relying upon what was then the still problematical organisation of the United Nations to assist us in the event of need (sic)."³

Japanese views were crystallizing on September 7, 1947, when the issue was discussed at length by Japan's leadership. During this discussion, former Prime Minister Shidehara (who according to MacArthur was the author of the "no war" clause) noted that: "As far as I am concerned, I cannot agree that we can expect much from membership in the United Nations. If Japan is attacked by a foreign country, I don't think we can expect any country to sacrifice its own soldiers in order to defend Japan. The United States may come to the aid of Japan, but if it does it will do so in its own interest and not just because there is a United Nations."⁴

Shortly after this meeting, Japanese thinking on the security problem was clarified in a memorandum drawn up in the name of the Central Liaison Agency by Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio Suehiro. The document subsequently was transmitted to General Robert Eichelberger, head of the U.S. Eighth Army for delivery to Washington. According to Yoshida, the memorandum handed Eichelberger:

. . . after stating the Japanese Government itself would be able to suppress any internal riots or disorders, went on to say:

'At this time of growing international insecurity, the Japanese Government, as the most desirable means of protecting Japan's independence, wishes to enter into a special agreement with the United States against external

³ Ibid., pp. 264-265.

⁴ John K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power, The Japanese Dilemma (New York, 1971), p. 63.

aggression by a third power; and at the same time, to build up its domestic police forces, on the ground and on the sea. Until the United Nations shows that it can perform the functions set forth in the Charter, we believe that it is the wish of the Japanese people to have Japan's security guaranteed by the United States.'

This document was based on the idea that the United States would maintain armed forces in the areas adjacent to Japan, and that Japan would maintain bases within the country to be made available for use by the United States forces in an emergency.⁵

While the hoped-for 1947 peace treaty fell through, the policy decision outlined in the Ashida memorandum was to form the basis for subsequent Japanese defense and security policy. Yoshida notes that "after I had resumed position of Prime Minister again in October 1948 it (the memorandum) was adopted by my Cabinet without change, although actually there were no further developments in that direction until the coming of Mr. Dulles to Japan in January 1951."⁶

The alliance proposed by the Japanese differs from the conventional idea of a mutual security alliance. Most alliances pledge the contracting parties to come to the aid of each other if either is attacked by a third party. The quid pro quo is obvious. The alliance proposed in the Ashida memorandum would not pledge Japan to come to the aid of the United States if the U.S. were attacked, but rather the United States would guarantee Japan's security in exchange for a guarantee of Japan's internal stability and base rights.

⁵Yoshida, Kaisō Jūnen, II, p. 114; cited in Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968 (New York and London, 1971), pp. 24-25. Weinstein also interviewed other postwar Japanese leaders on this point and they affirmed that Yoshida's statement was accurate as to the content of the Memorandum. Yoshida presents a similar description of the content of the Memorandum in his Memoirs, p. 265.

⁶Yoshida, Memoirs, p. 265.

The proposal rested on three assumptions by the Japanese: first, that the U.S.-Soviet split would continue for some time; second, that because of this split it was in the U.S. interest to defend Japan in the event of attack and, third, that the internal threat to Japan was real and that Japanese assumption of responsibility for containing this threat and provision for bases was sufficient quid pro quo to ensure mutuality in the defense treaty. If Japan could effect the policy outlined in Ashida's memorandum, she could ensure her security and at the same time retain a measure of independence.⁷

1951 Security Treaty

By late 1949 the U.S. State Department was again seriously considering a peace treaty with Japan. A punitive treaty had been ruled out, but there still remained the question of how to ensure U.S., Allied and Japanese security needs.⁸ The issue was finally settled by reaching a consensus that the matter of security would be separated from the peace treaty and the U.S. would negotiate separate bilateral security treaties with those allies desiring them and with Japan.⁹

With the outbreak of the Korean War, the necessity of maintaining U.S. troops in Japan was keenly felt in Washington; in fact, Pentagon pressure on this point threatened a swift conclusion of the peace treaty. The

⁷ As Japanese strategists predicted, U.S. thinking shifted from considering Japan a defeated enemy to that of a potential ally. This policy crystallized in a November 1948 decision by the National Security Council to deliberately shift the Occupation emphasis to action ensuring Japan would be a stable and friendly country when the Occupation was terminated.

⁸ Bernard C. Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy: the Making of of the Japanese Peace Settlement (Princeton, 1957), p. 12.

⁹ Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York, 1970), pp. 553-565.

Japanese were in agreement. On May 3, 1950, Finance Minister Ikeda, on the instructions of Prime Minister Yoshida, informed Joseph Dodge, with whom he had worked closely during the early Occupation period, that Japan desired a peace treaty as soon as possible and "believed that it was necessary that U.S. forces remain in Japan after the treaty to guarantee the security of Japan and Asia."¹⁰

Whether this was known to Special Ambassador Dulles when he visited Japan in mid-June 1950 is unknown. During these June meetings, Dulles sounded the Japanese out on the issue of rearmament. On this issue, Japanese and American views clashed. Prime Minister Yoshida claimed that rearmament was impossible at the time because of economic problems.¹¹ Neither side found the meetings productive, and it appears that both positions on the security issue were never fully explored.¹²

Negotiations broke off with the commencement of the Korean War. But, both sides had felt each other out, and the Japanese went to work on a policy position on the security issue. In October, Yoshida had two draft proposals drawn up. One permitted the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan and contained a provision imposing a duty on the United States to defend Japan from aggression. The other was a proposal to make Japan, Korea and the surrounding area a neutral zone in which foreign troops would be restricted.¹³ There is no evidence that the latter position was anything

¹⁰Katoo Shunsaku, "Postwar Japanese Security and Rearmament With Special Reference to Japanese-American Relations," Papers on Modern Japan (Canberra, 1968), p. 65; meeting between Dodge and Ikeda recounted by K. Mikazawa who attended.

¹¹Yoshida, Memoirs, p. 265.

¹²William J. Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan (New York, 1965), p. 257.

¹³Katoo, p. 66; cited from K. Nishimura, Kempoo Choosakai.

more than a bargaining paper and was ever considered a desirable solution to the security issue by the Japanese.¹⁴

In regard to the former proposal, the Yoshida Government considered "It an axiom of Japanese foreign policy that South Korea must not be permitted to fall into the hands of a hostile power."¹⁵ The Japanese could see the necessity for the stationing of troops in Japan for the support of operations in Korea. Since these troops served Japanese security interests, the Japanese made a subtle shift in the defense policy envisioned in the Ashida memorandum. Rather than providing bases in the event of an emergency, the Japanese would provide bases on a more permanent basis. Nonetheless, as Yoshida noted in his Memoirs, the underlying conception behind the memorandum "was the same as that on which the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was later to be based."¹⁶

By November, the Japanese had a comprehensive draft security treaty which embodied points made in the 1947 Ashida Memorandum:

1. Under the Charter of the United Nations and its Constitution, Japan has the right of self-defense against an unprovoked attack, and can cooperate with the United States in accordance with the Charter, to take necessary measures to repel aggression against Japan.

¹⁴Gerald L. Curtis, "The Dulles-Yoshida Negotiations on the San Francisco Peace Treaty," Columbia Essays in International Affairs Vol. II (New York and London, 1967), p. 49.

¹⁵Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, p. 50. Weinstein bases this assumption on the empirical evidence of subsequent events and an interview with Nishimura. This position had not been publicly stated until 1969, probably to avoid domestic crises.

¹⁶p. 265.

2. In the event that the United Nations determines that armed aggression has been committed against Japan, the United States agrees to take the military measures necessary to repel such an aggression. Japan, in the exercise of its right of self-defense, will cooperate with the United States in repelling such an aggression.

3. In the event that an armed attack is made against Japan, the United States and Japan will take necessary measures of individual and collective self-defense to repel such an attack in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

4. Since Japan is unarmed, the Parties agree to the stationing of United States forces in Japan, in order to make possible the implementation of Articles 2 and 3.

5. A joint United States-Japanese committee will be formed to facilitate consultation and cooperation on matters relating to Japan's security, and on the stationing of United States forces in Japan.

6. The treaty will be made effective for a period of fifteen years.¹⁷

The second round of negotiations over the peace treaty and related problems of Japan's security began in late January 1951. Dulles and Yoshida again clashed over rearmament. "The point in which America's special envoy was chiefly interested . . . concerned in what way a Japan without any armament to speak of could accept her share of responsibility as a member of the free world."¹⁸ The U.S. side pushed for Japanese rearmament as part of the free world security system. The figure of a 350,000-man army was used.¹⁹ The Japanese, on the other hand, took the position that it was not only at odds with the Constitution but was an economic impossibility.

The Japanese position against rearmament was not inflexible. They were quite willing to cooperate in the defense of Japan and because

¹⁷Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, pp. 57-58.

¹⁸Yoshida, Memoirs, p. 250.

¹⁹Interview with Nishimura Kumao by Martin Weinstein cited in Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, p. 59.

Yoshida realized that "we could not discuss the treaty . . . without committing ourselves to some effort to reinforce our defensive power . . . we outlined . . . a project, long under consideration, for increasing both our land and sea forces and placing them under the control of an embryo Ministry of Defense."²⁰

This commitment did not completely satisfy the U.S. negotiators and, consequently, the 1951 Treaty did not contain the specific provisions sought by the Japanese but only an implicit de facto guarantee of Japan's security by providing for the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan. The major point was that:

Article I. Japan grants, and the United States accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of the international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation of intervention by an outside Power or Powers.²¹

Unable to secure a concrete commitment on rearmament, Dulles, worried that the Japanese were getting a "free ride," secured recognition in the treaty preamble that the treaty was "provisional" and that the U.S. Forces would be maintained in and around Japan "in the expectation . . . that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression."²²

²⁰Yoshida, Memoirs, p. 267.

²¹United States, Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, III, Part III, p. 3331; hereafter cited as U.S. Treaties.

²²U.S. Treaties, III, Part III, p. 3331.

1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

The Japanese Government, during the intervening years from the signing of the 1951 Security Treaty and the 1960 Treaty, attempted by diplomacy to achieve what it failed to gain in the 1952 Treaty. It pressed for an explicit U.S. commitment to the external defense of Japan; consultation on defense matters, including troop and weapons movements and, ultimately, a new treaty which would eliminate the reference to use of U.S. troops controlling internal disorder and which would contain a specific date of expiration and a workable means for either extending or terminating it.²³

The principle joint agreement derived from the Security Treaty signed in 1951 was the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement concluded in March 1954. While the basic purpose of this agreement was to provide a legal basis for the United States to furnish military assistance, the agreement gained for the Japanese specific recognition of two points which had been proposed in the November 1950 draft. First, the preamble placed the Agreement within the framework of the United Nations charter. Second, although Japan formally acknowledged a commitment to limited rearmament, she obtained specific agreement that this commitment would be "consistent with the political and economic stability of Japan."²⁴ Recognition that political and economic cooperation and limited rearmament constituted a basis for mutuality in providing for a common defense was a major achievement for Japanese security planners.

²³James W. Morley, Japan and Korea: America's Allies in the Pacific (New York, 1965), p. 6 and Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, p. 64. Weinstein reviewed these aims with former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Robert Murphy (1952-53) who agreed they represented Japanese policy during his ambassadorship.

²⁴U.S. Treaties, V, Part I, p. 663.

The next step was to establish the principle of prior consultation over the use of U.S. forces stationed in Japan. This principle was established by two agreements reached during the 1950's. In May 1954, Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru and American Ambassador John Alliston reached an agreement whereby the United States agreed to consult with Japan prior to the introduction of nuclear weapons. This arrangement was put to the test a year later when U.S. Honest John missiles with atomic capabilities were emplaced in Japan. Their emplacement had the approval of the Japanese; however, the Japanese exercised their right of consultation and warheads were not introduced.

The second instance of the principle of de facto prior consultation was the establishment in August 1957 of the Japanese-American Committee on Security. Comprised of the Japanese Foreign Minister and Director General of the Defense Agency on one side and the U.S. Ambassador and Commander in Chief Pacific on the other, the objective of the Committee was to discuss all matters relevant to the implementation of the Security Treaty. Establishment of this committee was the result of Japanese efforts to open negotiation for revision of the Security Treaty. It was also utilized as a back-door instrument to begin these negotiations.²⁵

Two other happenings during the 1950's were to influence the course of events leading to a new security treaty. The first of these was the slow but steady increase in the size and effectiveness of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. The second was the return to normalcy in Northwest Asia after the hot war in Korea.

²⁵ This committee, renamed the Security Consultative Committee, is utilized as the instrument for implementing the prior consultation provisions of the 1960 Treaty.

Because there seemed no option but to increase the size of the defense forces in order to gain a mutual defense pact (a point recognized in the 1951 Treaty preamble), Yoshida expanded the police reserve into a 100,000-man National Safety Force in 1952. This force was again re-organized in 1954 into the present Self Defense Forces. Significantly, the reorganization legislation²⁶ included "among the duties of the new Security Forces that of repelling foreign invasion."²⁷ Initial authorized strength was set at 152,110. By 1958, authorized strength was 222,102 and the actual strength was approximately 214,000.²⁸

Coincident with this increase in the size of Japan's armed forces, tensions in the Far East subsided. This reduction of tensions led U.S. policy makers to scale down their previous estimate of the size forces Japan required to defend herself. By the late 1950's, the rearmament issue was not a serious impediment to conclusion of a new treaty.

The role of the Self Defense Forces in paving the way toward the 1960 Treaty cannot be overemphasized. Its growth during the 1950's is at least in part directly related to the diplomatic needs of the country in achieving a mutual defense security pact. Since 1958, it has grown only about 12 percent in size. Ground self defense forces have grown less than five percent.

Patient Japanese diplomacy and a change in the world situation brought the United States closer to the Japanese point of view on security policy;

²⁶The Defense Establishment Bill and the Self Defense Forces Bill. The latter bill sets the mission of the SDF "to defend Japan against direct and indirect aggression and, when necessary, to maintain public order."

²⁷Yoshida, Memoirs, p. 188.

²⁸Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, p. 111.

and, by the late 1950's, the climate was right for the negotiation of a new security treaty.

At Japanese instigation, negotiations began in 1958 and continued in fits and starts through the following year and the new treaty was signed on January 19, 1960.²⁹ The new treaty sets the treaty obligations within the framework of the United Nations charter. No mention is made of the use of foreign troops to suppress internal disorders, and both parties agreed that after ten years the treaty may be terminated on one year's notice by either party. Articles III thru VI state:

Article III. The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

Article IV. The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

Article V. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article VI. For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

²⁹ The subject had been explored at an earlier date. Prime Minister Kishi's June 1957 trip to the U.S. was in part to explore the possibility of beginning negotiations.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of the United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.³⁰

Article III contained the long-sought recognition from the United States that Japan's guarantee of her internal security, her willingness to provide bases for defense and limited rearmament were acceptable as the quid pro quo for mutual defense. In Articles IV and V, Japan received an explicit guarantee of U.S. aid for her external defense and security. In exchange for this, Japan was required to act only in the event of an attack on Japan.

Article IV, taken together with the statement in the preamble that both countries recognized "a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,"³¹ provides an indication that the Japanese viewed the treaty as serving their security interests defined more broadly than just defense of the home islands.

Since Japan was not committed to act in any way, the statements referring to a shared interest in the stability of the Far East could be interpreted as window dressing except that the Japanese Government explicitly defined the geographical area covered by the term Far East during the Diet debates over ratification. The official unified position was that the area covered is the area north of the Philippines, in and around Japan, Korea, the area under control of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the northern territories held by the Soviets.³² Within this area the Japanese expect that the terms

³⁰U.S. Treaties, XI, Part II, p. 1634.

³¹Ibid., p. 1633.

³²Emmerson, p. 83.

of the Security Treaty will provide for Japan's security interests.

From the Japanese viewpoint, the 1960 Treaty contained a defect. The 1951 Treaty represented an explicit guarantee that U.S. troops would remain stationed in and about Japan. Article VI of the new treaty, while providing for bases, did not guarantee that U.S. troops would be stationed there. It also placed no constraints on how these troops might be armed or utilized. The Japanese desired to continue the de facto guarantee of U.S. defense symbolized by these troops and also to ensure that they would not be utilized in combat outside of Japan proper without Japanese consent. The United States was unwilling to clarify these points in the treaty text. Nonetheless, the Japanese were successful in establishing, by formal exchange of notes, the following principle:

Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in the equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said (Security) Treaty, shall be subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan.³³

In the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and related prior consultation note, the Japanese had achieved what they had set out to do in 1947. They had achieved an explicit guarantee of Japan's security while maintaining a measure of independence.

In one final exchange of notes concurrent with the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan explicitly recognized the continued importance to Japan of the security of Korea and agreed to continue in effect the arrangement signed concurrent to the 1951 Treaty permitting use

³³U.S. Treaties, XI, Part II, p. 1646-47.

of bases in Japan for operations in Korea. This note deserves a closer look. The original 1952 agreement stated that "if and when the forces of a member or members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan . . . forces engaged in such United Nations action."³⁴

This agreement represented Japanese recognition of the fact that such support was in progress at the time of its signing and also that the security of the Korean peninsula was important to Japan. Japan was willing if not anxious to continue to support this agreement. In fact, in October 1958 Prime Minister Kishi publicly remarked to an NBC reporter that Japan's right of self defense must be expected to include South Korea and Taiwan.³⁵

But, in 1960 the Japanese were less willing to provide the blanket approval for the use of Japanese bases for support of United Nations actions anywhere in the Far East given in 1952. Therefore, the 1960 Kishi-Herter notes on the subject of the use of bases to support United Nations actions limited use to those actions in support of the July 7, 1950, United Nations Security Council Resolution; i.e., to those actions ensuring the security of the Korean Peninsula. Use of the bases was also made contingent upon Japanese approval by applying the principle of prior consultation to their use.

In addition to providing an indication of Japan's security interests, the Kishi-Herter notes provide an indication that from the Japanese point of view the operational, as distinct from the deterrent, role of American

³⁴ U.S. Treaties, III, Part III, p. 3328.

³⁵ Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York, 1969), p. 191.

troops in Japan is to provide for the defense of the Far East as defined by the Japanese.

This viewpoint gained further expression in the 1963 "General Defense Plan of Operation"--the so-called "Three Arrows Study"--which according to opposition politicians represented Self Defense Forces plans in the event of another crisis on the peninsula. The study stated that:

In the case of another Korean Crisis, the SDF will fulfill defensive assignments which include helping blockade the eastern coast of China and supporting U.S. offensive action by serving as a reserve force . . . During the emergency period, all activity will be conducted on a basis of total mobilization.³⁶

The "Three Arrows" were to be U.S. forces drawn from Japan, Okinawa and Hawaii.

The operational role of Japan's Self Defense Forces, now that it had expanded to the point where it could be used as a diplomatic pawn in the security treaty negotiations, was to provide for internal security and to raise the threshold for any potential enemy inviting U.S. retaliation.

The Fight for Ratification

Japanese diplomacy had scored significant gains with the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security on January 19, 1960. Most importantly, the treaty represented an explicit guarantee that the United States would provide for the external defense of Japan and that this alliance would, through the principle of prior consultation on the use of troops, not draw Japan into entanglements not of her own choosing.

The basic concept of the treaty was favored by virtually all members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Since the Liberal Democrats had

³⁶Tsukasa Matsueda, "Japan's Shifting Attitudes Toward the Military," Asian Survey, VII No. 9 (September, 1967), p. 614.

achieved a clear majority of 287 members in the House of Representatives (as opposed to 180 members for all other political parties) in the May 1958 election, there should have been no problem in ratifying the foreign policy decision. Instead, the treaty was ratified only after police had forceably ejected Socialist demonstrators from the Diet chambers and a mockery was made of the parliamentary process. Following passage, Japan was racked by the largest and most violent demonstrations in history.³⁷

When the Kishi Government approached the U.S. Government about treaty revision in the summer of 1958, the conservative Liberal Democrats were split into a "mainstream" composed of the factions led by Prime Minister Kishi and faction leaders Ono, Kono and Sato and an "anti-mainstream" group composed of the factions led by faction leaders Ikeda, Miki, Matsumura and Ishibashi.³⁸

While both groups favored revision of the security treaty, the factional alliances took opposing sides on the question of whether Okinawa should be included in the treaty area and other minor issues. The 1952 Peace Treaty had placed the Ryukyus (Okinawa) under U.S. administration and Prime Minister Kishi wished to include a statement in the revised security treaty acknowledging Japan's residual sovereignty over the islands. Within the mainstream, only the Kishi and Kono factions favored this proposal. The anti-mainstream factions, for the purely political reason of embarrassing the mainstream, favored delay on the whole treaty issue until the Okinawa issue was settled.

³⁷ The most complete account of events surrounding the Security Treaty crises is found in George W. Packard, Protest in Tokyo The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960 (Princeton, 1966).

³⁸ Ibid., p. 70.

Since Kishi did not wish to delay negotiations, he had to come to some accommodation. He and his Foreign Minister Fukuyama spent the winter and spring trying to hammer out a compromise. Kono, who had ambitions to succeed Kishi, was dropped from the cabinet in January in order to strengthen the hand of the Kishi faction, and Kishi moved toward the anti-mainstream position on the Okinawa issue. An agreement on all issues involved in the new treaty was reached only two days before negotiations with the U.S. resumed and then only because the anti-mainstream factions didn't want a public party split.

Kishi still had to gain complete support for the treaty within the party; and, in June 1959, the cabinet was again shaken up and, in a deal for support on the treaty issue, Ikeda Hayato was promised the support of the mainstream in his bid to become the next Prime Minister upon retirement of Kishi. His faction joined the mainstream and the Ono faction moved to the opposition side within the party. (This deal apparently also included support for mainstreamer Sato as Ikeda's eventual successor.)³⁹

The factional shuffling resulted in a 15-month delay in the signing of a treaty, not because the conservatives were opposed to a new treaty but because the policy decision became entangled in the intraparty maneuvering for political leadership. The result of the delay was more far-reaching than deciding factional positions within the party. The delay also helped spread a feeling of anxiety over the proposed treaty, allowed the anti-treaty opposition parties enough time to mount a strong protest and, finally, because the feud weakened his position within the party, caused the resignation of the Prime Minister once the issue was settled.⁴⁰ Had the issue not been

³⁹Ibid., pp. 77-78.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 80-81.

caught up in factional politics, the anti-treaty forces would not have been able to mount an effective protest, public opinion would have favored the treaty issue⁴¹ and Kishi probably would not have had to step down.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 149-152. Polls conducted in 1957 showed a consensus in Japan in favor of treaty revision. By August 1959 only a little more than seven percent of those polled favored revision.

NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS: 1952-1969

Background

The postwar world Japan reentered in 1952 was a different world from that of the summer of 1945. The allied wartime alliance had broken up and solidified into a bipolar cold war. The Communists had won the Civil war in China and the Kuomintang Government had fled to Japan's former colony of Taiwan. Two mutually antagonistic states had emerged in Korea after it was granted independence.

These changes in the international situation were to impose immediate problems for Japan. Japan had been led to believe that the question of normalization of relations with the states of Northeast Asia which were not signatories to the San Francisco Peace Treaty (China, Korea and the Soviet Union) was an issue which she could attend to in a manner that was to be neither hurried nor forced and which would be based upon her own interests.¹ The only qualification was to be that restoration of relations with non-signatory states, undertaken during the first three years following the signing of the Peace Treaty, was required to be on terms substantially the same as those with the signatories of the San Francisco Treaty.

Restoration of normal relations with China, Korea and the Soviet Union, while essential to Japan's security and commerce, would not be an easy task. The events of the first half of the Twentieth Century had left bitterness on both sides. Japan and China had been involved in conflict almost continuously since 1894. Conflict over hegemony over the Korean Peninsula had led to the Russo-Japanese War and, in 1910, to direct annexation of Korea by Japan.

¹Yoshida, Memoirs, p. 253.

Feelings resulting from the experiences during the first half of the century run high both in Japan and throughout all of Northeast Asia. Russia ranks as the least-liked nation. The negative attitude toward Russia was expressed in 1957 poll where she was ranked as the "most disliked" nation by 31% of the sample.² During the negotiations leading up to the Peace Agreement, 60% blamed Russia for lack of progress, attributing it to her high-handed and unfair tactics.³ Even today, this feeling appears to be prevalent. A 1969 poll asked what country "Japan must get along with on the most friendly terms from here on out." Only 2% mentioned Russia.⁴ Japanese feelings toward Korea also run high. In a 1953 poll, only one in three felt optimistic when asked the question: "Do you think Japan and Korea can become close friends in the future?"⁵ During the ROK Treaty negotiations, 1/3 of the sample felt Japan should "be tougher" as opposed to 1/10 who felt Japan should "be milder" in the conduct of negotiations.⁶ The Japanese felt no need to apologize to the Koreans for events of the preceding fifty years, and "no two people on earth liked each other less."⁷

² Douglas H. Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961), p. 50.

³ Ibid., p. 202.

⁴ U.S. Congress, Senate, U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad Okinawa (Washington, 1970), p. 1425.

⁵ Mendel, Japanese People, p. 191.

⁶ Ibid., p. 184.

⁷ Lawrence Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia (New York, 1970), p. 102.

Surprisingly, the same strong feelings do not apply to the Chinese. The Japanese have a sentimental feeling toward China based on cultural and racial affinities.⁸ They not only share a common written language, but Japan borrowed much of her religion, art and philosophy from the Chinese. To this feeling of affinity, some degree of a feeling of guilt over Japan's actions in the late 19th and bulk of the 20th centuries is felt by numerous Japanese intellectuals.⁹ This said, the polls still show that the Chinese rank low in the esteem of the Japanese, along with the Koreans and Russians.¹⁰

With this background of bitterness and mistrust, Japan, in 1952, faced the task of making peace with the Russians and Chinese and of restoring relations with the former colony of Korea.

Japan's response to the problems was to be mostly negative, reacting to rather than proposing policy. Once the issues were drawn, they quickly became ensnarled in domestic politics.

Soviet Union

Russia's attitude toward Japan in the immediate postwar period was hostile. Late in entering the war against Japan, the Soviets seized the northern islands of Kunashiri, Etoforu, Shikotan and the Habomais group which had been administered as part of Hokkaido prior to the war. As late as 1950, she concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the People's Republic of China which singled out Japan by name as the potential aggressor.¹¹ But, by the fall of 1954, the easing

⁸Shao Chuan Leng, Japan and Communist China (Koyoto, 1958), p. 107.

⁹Ibid., pp. 108-109.

¹⁰Olsen, p. 102.

¹¹The pact was directly aimed "at preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan."

of world tensions evidenced in Europe by the Soviet unilateral declaration of a cessation of the state of war with Germany was evidenced in the Far East by announcement that the USSR desired to normalize relations with Japan.

This announcement coincided with a particularly unstable period in Japanese politics. In December 1954, dissident conservative politicians united in a newly-formed Democratic party, managed with Socialist help to unseat Prime Minister Yoshida and established a new government led by Hatoyama Ichiro. Establishment of the new cabinet offered Japan an opportunity to pursue new goals, and Hatoyama announced that a major goal of his administration would be normalization of relations as part of a general desire to settle issues outstanding since World War II.

Opportunities for new directions in Japanese diplomacy looked bright when, on January 25, 1955, the Soviets formally requested that negotiations begin for the purpose of restoring relations. Talks began in London on June 1. After initial bargaining, the Soviets dropped a demand for the neutralization of Japan and offered to restore the Hobomai and Shikotan Islands. These concessions met the minimum requirements set by the Hatoyama Government for a settlement and prospects looked even brighter for normalization.¹² Suddenly, the Japanese Government reversed itself and also demanded return of Etoforu and Kunashiri and suggested later negotiations for return of the other Kuriles and Sakhalin. The Soviet refused and talks were broken off.

¹²Interview with Japanese negotiator Matsumoto Shunichi on January 20, 1963, cited in Hellmann, Japanese Domestic Politics, p. 34.

The rationale behind the Japanese shift in position lies in conservative party politics. The original Japanese policy position had been made while Hayayama was firmly in control of the situation. But, conservative dominance of Japanese politics could not be maintained in the face of strong Socialist opposition unless the two conservative parties came to terms. Merger talks began in July between the Liberal and Democrat conservative parties. Under this pressure for conservative unity, pressure from the Liberal party opposition for a harder line in negotiations and the hard line attitude by factions within his own Democratic party, Hatoyama could not maintain his previous policy position and had to shift to a new harder line on the territorial issue. "Little attention (was) given to the international consequence of the action."¹³

The onset of negotiations with the Soviets caught the main opposition party, the Socialists, at a disadvantage for two reasons. First, they had been advocating the issue in general terms for years. Second, the right and left Socialist parties had just begun negotiations for merger. Ideological differences over a strong Soviet stand might make this difficult. For these reasons, the Socialists supported the initial London talks. Their stand was virtually identical to that of the Government except that they opposed any territorial concessions. As the conservative interparty squabbling came to dominate the policy-making process, the Socialists seized upon it as an issue with which to criticize the conservatives. This tended to put them in an awkward position of genuinely desiring to see relations with the Soviet Union normalized but of losing an issue if they were. As a result, while the factional struggle continued in the

¹³Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 59.

conservative party, the opposition party equivocated, providing no real input into the decision-making process.

When negotiations reopened in January 1956, the Soviets suggested a formula similar to that used in negotiations for peace with West Germany, where territorial issues were shelved for later consideration. Because the conservatives were now committed to a hard line on the territorial issue in order to maintain the intraparty factional balance, this solution was rejected. Negotiations broke off indefinitely in March.

In order to get the Japanese back to the bargaining table, the Soviets applied economic pressures in the form of an announcement of fishing restrictions in the Soviet-controlled areas of the Northern Pacific. This brought immediate results. The fishing industry was the main financial prop of a party faction led by Kono Ichiro. Kono's support was essential to maintaining the mainstream in power. The Government immediately endeavored to solve the fisheries issue. Kono, in his role as Agriculture and Forestry Minister, was sent to Moscow to work out a settlement. The fishing issue was quickly settled, but the Soviets achieved their purpose by tying the settlement to an agreement by the Japanese to resume negotiations. Because it needed Kono's support and this was contingent on the outcome of the fishing agreement, the Government resumed talks on July 31.

Although they agreed to resume negotiations, a compromise policy position could not be worked out by the conservatives. As a result, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu went to the bargaining table with little direction. Shigemitsu was on record as having opposed territorial concessions; however, he reversed himself and agreed that return of Shikotan and Habomais would satisfy Japanese territorial demands in a Peace Treaty

settlement. In reversing himself, Shigemitsu may have been bowing to the realities of world politics, but he was exceeding his authority. In fact, it appears he was making a play for support in a bid for party leadership. Since Hatoyama's retirement was imminent, Shigemitsu's action was probably "an abortive attempt to capture the prestige that would accrue from the settlement of what had become a tiresome and divisive issue in Japan."¹⁴

Since settlement on the terms accepted by Shigemitsu would have a divisive impact on the mainstream party factional alignment, the Cabinet ordered the talks broken off. On August 10, Hatoyama publicly announced he would retire when the normalization issue was settled and a successor chosen. This placed the issue of negotiation with the Soviets even more squarely in the maelstrom of intraparty politics over the issue of party control.

At this point, Japanese business interests, the financial strength behind all conservative factions, fearful that the issue was tearing the conservative party apart and would lead to a Socialist takeover, entered the picture. In September, the largest employers associations issued a public statement calling on the conservatives to reestablish order within the party and suspend negotiations until the power struggle was settled. Party reaction was immediate and intense, condemning business interference, and plans for a settlement with the Soviets continued.

Hatoyama's announced intention to have the issue settled prior to his retirement was coupled with an announcement that he would travel to Moscow and directly negotiate the issue himself. He did not announce any

¹⁴Ibid., p. 63.

change in Japan's stand on the territorial issue. But, because of the divisiveness of this issue, Hatoyama adopted the compromise formula disentangling the peace settlement, resumption of diplomatic relations and other issues from the territorial issue. This approach was adopted not because it necessarily represented Japan's best interests but because the conservative mainstream could come to no other agreement among themselves. As the issue had become completely intertwined with intraparty politics, these political issues had to be settled in order to secure support for the foreign policy move. Thus, acceptance of Hatoyama's new position vis-a-vis the Russians was contingent upon his immediate retirement and retention of the entire Cabinet.¹⁵

With Japan's foreign policy position finally settled, Hatoyama journeyed to Moscow on October 15, and on October 19 the Peace Agreement ending the state of war between Japan and the Soviet Union was signed.

With the exception of the territorial issue, the Peace Agreement ended the state of war and settled outstanding issues between the two countries. The Soviets accepted Japan as a full member of the international community and, with this support (explicitly stated in Article Four), Japan was admitted to membership in the United Nations on December 18, 1956.

The unresolved territorial issue continues to stand in the way of a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union. In the 1956 Peace Agreement, the Soviets promised to return Shikotan and the Habomais group to Japanese administration when a peace treaty was signed. On their side, the Japanese have pressed continuously for return of Etoforu and Kunashiri ever since their sudden shift in position at the London Conference. While

¹⁵ Ashai Shimbun, September 7, 1956: cited in Ibid.

normal diplomatic relations have been maintained, direct negotiations for a peace treaty have not been initiated since the 1956 Agreement.

Korea

Negotiations for normalization of relations with Japan's former colony of Korea began at SCAP insistence even before the San Francisco Peace Treaty became effective. They were complicated by the division of the country into two mutually hostile parties and the immense bitterness arising out of the Japanese occupation.

Because of the then existing international situation, negotiations were conducted only with the South Korean Government. The Koreans were of a mind to demand reparations scaled to the level of real and imagined injuries. President Syngman Rhee was the "very incarnation of outraged nationalism"¹⁶ and "appeared to be obsessed with the danger of forgiving the Japanese or allowing them to restore relationships in Korea."¹⁷ The Japanese were as little inclined to give the Koreans any satisfaction, especially after Korea declared a "fisheries conservation zone" around the southern part of the peninsula which extended to as far as 50 miles offshore. Japanese fishing boats violating this zone were seized or sunk and the fishermen imprisoned. In fact, serious negotiations did not begin until the Rhee Government was toppled.

Issues in the Japanese-Korean negotiations included recognition of the jurisdiction of the ROK over the entire peninsula, the fisheries question, status of the hundreds of thousands of Koreans residing in Japan, property claims and the ownership of the Island of Takashima.¹⁸

¹⁶Olson, p. 103.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 105.

¹⁸Morley, pp. 58-62.

The mutual antagonism between the Japanese and the Koreans was to have an influence in effecting quasi official ties with the North Korean Government, permitting repatriation of Korean nationals residing in Japan since World War II. This action was favored by the Socialists and other left parties. Left wing organizations cooperated with North Korean attempts through the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Choren) to influence the Japanese Government to permit repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to North Korea.¹⁹ This pressure and the desire to be rid of the Koreans resulted in an agreement by the Japanese Government to let the Japanese Red Cross Society and the North Korean Red Cross Society work out an agreement for repatriation of those wanting to return. This agreement was signed in 1959 and has since been renewed as it expires. By the end of 1967, some 85,000 Koreans had been repatriated.²⁰

How much this policy decision was influenced by opposition party pressure and how much by a simple desire to get rid of the unwanted Korean minority is unknown. In any case, it does appear that government policy had been influenced by consideration of opposite party pressures on this issue even at the risk of offending the South Koreans. The sporadic negotiations with the South Koreans did in fact break off over the repatriation issue.

They resumed again late in 1960 after the fall of Syngman Rhee from power. The new Korean Government took a much more realistic view toward negotiations with the Japanese, and prospects for normalization of relations brightened.

¹⁹Koh, pp. 191-192.

²⁰Sung Sung Cho, "Japan's Two Korea's Policy and the Problems of Korean Unification," Asian Survey, VII, No. 10 (October 1967), p. 710.

This period of renewed Korean interest coincided with the Prime Ministership of Ikeda Hayato. Ikeda had emerged as Prime Minister and President of the LDP in the turmoil following ratification of the Security Treaty. Intraparty factional strife had played a major part in bringing down the Kishi government; and, in an effort to heal the wounds both within and without the conservative party, the Ikeda Government adopted a "low profile" posture; that is, policies which would anger the opposition Socialists and create dissention within the LDP ranks were not attempted.

Ikeda apparently personally favored normalization of relations with Korea and he had powerful support in the Kishi and Ishii factions of the conservative party. Because of his personal interest in normalization of relations, Ikeda was susceptible to pressure from the business community for increased economic contact with South Korea. In the prewar period, Korea had been an important market, and, with the nationalistic Rhee Government no longer on the scene, business saw new opportunities. Ikeda was pressured by South Korean sympathizers with the conservative party to encourage business interests by supporting non-governmental trade missions to the Republic of Korea "for the purpose of investigating possibilities of private investment in order to pave the way for normalizing relations."²¹

Nonetheless, Ikeda's position as President of the LDP was never secure enough to force the issue.²² Therefore, until illness caused his retirement

²¹Donald C. Hellmann, "Basic Problems in Japanese-South Korean Relations," Asian Survey, II, No. 3 (May 1962), p. 21.

²²Ibid., p. 22.

in the fall of 1964, the Government maintained a "low posture" vis-a-vis the Korean question. Ikeda's successor, Sato Eisaku, younger brother of former Prime Minister Kishi, for political purposes, adopted a "high posture" in foreign relations, and negotiations for normalization of relations began again, this time in earnest.

Resumption of talks with the South Koreans brought opposition from the left parties. As a general policy, they had long held the position that, while they favored normalization of relations with the Republic of Korea because it would impeded efforts at reunification of the peninsula.²³

Direct opposition to the normalization of relations with South Korea became apparent as the success of the negotiations became more certain. Socialist critics were declaring: "Let the ROK-Japan normalization treaty be the second round of fighting to follow up the struggle over the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty!"²⁴ These tactics failed to halt the progress of the ROK-Japanese negotiations; and, by the spring of 1965, the treaty, notes on proceedings and agreements had been signed.

All issues except basic diplomatic recognition were handled in separate agreements and protocols. The basic treaty is the most important document. During negotiations, the Koreans had insisted that the ROK be acknowledged as the only lawful government on the peninsula with jurisdiction over all of both North and South Korea. "In the face of vehement opposition at home, the . . . Sato government became extremely cautious about the wording of the agreements and wanted to choose a flexible terminology by which it could

²³They also feared that normalization of relations with the anti-communist South Koreans would draw Japan into a military entanglement.

²⁴Fumio Ikematsu, "The ROK-Japan Treaty and Political Parties," Contemporary Japan, XXVII, No. 3 (May 1966), p. 496.

more easily defend its policy of normalizing relations as well as its stand on the status of the two Korean regimes.²⁵

The result was that the Japanese Government insisted on the following language concerning sovereignty on the Korean Peninsula:

Article III

It is confirmed that the government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea as specified in the Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly.²⁶

The phrase "as specified" was inserted over vehement ROK objections. The difference in attitudes is reflected in the different interpretation placed on this article. South Korea stressed that Japan recognized her jurisdiction over the entire peninsula since the North Korean regime was illegal. The Japanese government argued that the treaty article must be interpreted in light of the U.N. resolution and, thus, the treaty application was limited to the area under the present jurisdiction of the South Korean government; i.e., south of the cease fire line.²⁷

When examined, Japan's interpretation of Article III seems more appropriate than that of South Korea. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 195 (III) declares that:

. . . there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea.²⁸

²⁵Cho, p. 705.

²⁶Hans H. Baerwald, "Nikkan Kokkai: the Japan-Korea Treaty Diet," Cases in Comparative Politics Asia (Boston, 1970), p. 46.

²⁷Cho, pp. 706-707.

²⁸Cited in John M. Maki, Conflict and Tensions in the Far East (Seattle 1961), p. 186.

Prime Minister Sato, discussing the treaty, stated that Japan recognized "the fact that another authority is actually controlling North Korea (and Japan would deal with North Korea) on a case by case basis."²⁹ Thus, Japan had left herself an out in order to pursue her interests as they arose.

With the exception of jurisdiction over Takashima, other issues dividing the two countries were resolved to satisfaction.

The fiftieth Special Diet convened in October 1965 to consider the ROK Treaty and related agreements. Factional politics played an important part of the LDP strategy during the Diet session. The mainstream leadership utilized their patronage position in order to secure unqualified intra-party support for treaty ratification during the session. The prestigious Chairmanship of the Special Diet committee considering the ROK Treaty was assigned to Ando Kaku, an important member of the anti-mainstream group with the LDP, in order to strengthen ties within the party on this issue.³⁰ Similarly, anti-mainstream supporter Tamura Hajime was designated leader of the successful floor strategy which resulted in passage of the treaty. This appeared to be a move to ensure that all LDP members participated in the final vote.³¹

²⁹Cho, p. 707.

³⁰Baerwald, p. 29.

³¹Ibid., pp. 36-37. Active participation by party members was absolutely essential because of the Tamura strategy to break the deadlock which had resulted from Socialist and Communist opposition. Faced with a time constraint and the prospect of further opposition inspired delay tactics, the conservatives kept the Diet in continuous session, and then just after midnight on November 12th bodily blocked all the approaches to the speaker's platform. The speaker then called for a standing vote on a move to change the order of business. (Everyone was by then on their feet and the motion carried) With most of the opposition caught out of the chamber and the speaker's platform protected by the largest conservatives Tamura could find, the motion to approve the ROK Treaty quickly carried.

When the fiftieth Special Diet opened to consider the ROK-Japan normalization papers, the left opposition led by the Socialists adopted much the same tactics as they had during the Security Treaty Diet.³² Their go slow tactics and parliamentary machinations eventually forced the conservatives to resort to quasi-legal methods to bring the treaty issue to the floor in order for the conservative majority to vote it through. On December 8, 1965, the treaty was ratified.

China

Because the allied powers could not agree on whether the Communist or Nationalist government should represent China, she was not a participant at the San Francisco Peace Conference. As a result, Ambassador Dulles and British Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison reached an agreement that "Japan's future attitude toward China . . . must necessarily be for determination by Japan itself in the sovereign and independent status contemplated by the Treaty."³³

Events were to make a mockery of this understanding. The accord between Dulles and Morrison disturbed many influential members of the U.S. Senate who were worried that, kept to herself, Japan might conclude a peace treaty not in the U.S. interest (i.e., with Communist China). On September 12, 1951, four days after the signing of the San Francisco Treaty, 56 Senators signed a letter addressed to the President which stated: "Prior to the submission of the Japanese Treaty to the Senate, we desire to make it clear that we would consider the recognition of Communist China by Japan or the negotiating of a bilateral treaty with the Communist Chinese

³³Acheson, p. 695.

regime to be adverse to the best interests of the people of both Japan and the United States."³⁴

The implications of this letter were not lost on the Japanese Government; and, when Dulles returned to Japan in the fall of 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida provided him with written assurances of his government's intention not to conclude a bilateral treaty of peace with Communist China.³⁵ This assuaged the Senate.

As promised, Yoshida concluded a treaty of peace with the Nationalist government on April 28, 1952, which came into force on the same date as the San Francisco Treaty. This treaty displayed the same realism expressed by Yoshida a year earlier where he stated: "Red or white, China remains our next-door neighbor."³⁶ In the treaty, Japan did not commit herself to a recognition of the Nationalist government as the representative of all China. The mutual understanding of both countries was that "The terms of the present Treaty shall, in respect to the Republic of China, be applicable to all the territories which are now, or which may be hereafter, under the control of its Government."³⁷ Japan had left herself an out. While conducting normal relations with the Nationalist government, she could also protect her interests vis-a-vis the Mainland.³⁸

³⁴The Congressional Record, Vol. 97, Part 9 (September 13, 1951--October 2, 1951), pp. 11370-71. Among the signators of this document were Senators Robert Taft, Joseph McCarthy, Richard Nixon, Wayne Morse, Karl Mundt, James Eastland and Leverett Saltonstall.

³⁵Cohen, p. 152.

³⁶Yoshida, "Japan and the Crises in Asia," Foreign Affairs (January 1951), p. 179; cited in Leng, p. 12.

³⁷Exchange of Notes April 28, 1952, cited in China Handbook 1952-53, (Taipei, 1952), p. 157-158.

³⁸Ambassador Sebald suggests that this tactic was adopted as the result of a suggestion by Ambassador Dulles during a meeting with Yoshida December 10, 1951; Sebald, p. 286.

The Japanese government was not enthusiastic over concluding the separate peace with the Nationalist government. Yoshida was later to remark:

As far as the Japanese Government was concerned, increased friendship and improved economic relations with Taiwan were naturally most welcome. On the other hand, it was our wish to avoid, if possible, going too far in that direction and manifestly renouncing the Peking government. . . . Suspicions (about recognition of the mainland government) had been expressed in the United States Senate. While the relationship with mainland China was admittedly very important to us, it would have been intolerable to have the ratification of the Peace Treaty interfered by it. We had to make up our minds in a hurry on the question of which government we should conclude a peace treaty, and under the circumstances we could not but choose the Nationalist Government.³⁹

While the overall goal of conservative Japanese governments has been the hope that Japan would "ultimately . . . have a full measure of political peace and commercial intercourse with China,"⁴⁰ the conservative position quickly moved to what has been defined as the doctrine of separation of politics and economics in Sino-Japanese relations. This position appears to be the result of three major factors: first, the existence of the Peace Treaty with the Nationalist government and the opposition of both Chinas to a "two Chinas" concept; second, the insistence of the Mainland government on making a political settlement contingent on Japanese renunciation of ties with the United States and, third, the opposition to any formal ties to Mainland China by both the United States and the Nationalist government and pro-Taiwan members of the conservative party. The success of this policy is largely dependent on the actions of the Mainland government. Since Communist Chinese foreign policy toward Japan

³⁹Yoshida, Sekai to Nihon, p. 146; cited in Haruhiru Fukui, Party in Power the Japanese Liberal Democrats and Policy Making (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), p. 237.

⁴⁰"Letter from Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to John Foster Dulles, consultant to the Secretary of State, December 24, 1951"; cited in Acheson, p. 963.

has been directed toward easing her out of the American orbit and securing diplomatic recognition as the only legitimate government of all China, the Chinese, not unnaturally, attempt to link economics and politics.

During the period 1952 to 1957, a variety of contrasts with the Mainland were carried out. Strictly private agreements on trade (totaling about \$250,000,000⁴¹), fishing rights and repatriation of war criminals were successfully negotiated with official encouragement. These informal relations reached their peak under the Hatoyama government. Hatoyama himself favored relaxation of relations with China as well as the Soviet Union⁴²; but, any thought of formal relaxation was quickly shelved because of the factional battle over normalization of relations with the Soviets.

A highpoint in early Sino-Japanese relations was the signing of a fourth private trade agreement in March 1958. This agreement was of special significance because it was tantamount to a consular and trade agreement. A permanent PRC trade mission was to be established in Tokyo and granted diplomatic privileges including the right to use codes, exemption from customs requirements and the right to fly the PRC national flag over the mission headquarters.⁴³

This highpoint was in reality anticlimactical. The government of Kishi Nobusuke had come to power in February 1957; and, while wishing to maintain trade relations with the PRC, was attempting to redefine an

⁴¹Because of Japan's adherence to COCOM and CHINCOM export restrictions actual trade was much smaller. It rose from 5% of the first agreement to about 75% of the third.

⁴²Hellmann, Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 32.

⁴³Douglas M. Johnston, "Marginal Diplomacy in East Asia," International Journal, XXVI No. 3 (Summer 1971), p. 499.

independent Japanese policy in relation to the U.S. security alliance. With relations already cooling and in the face of strong Nationalist Chinese pressure against concessions, Kishi announced that, while the Japanese would "'respect the spirit' of the fourth private agreement and provide 'support and assistance' within the framework of Japanese Domestic law"⁴⁴, his government could not allow the Chinese to fly the PRC flag. This assuaged factional dissidents within the mainstream who supported the Nationalist government position, but the PRC cancelled the agreement.⁴⁵

It seems probable that the underlying motive for cancellation by the Chinese was twofold: firstly, to influence the Japanese elections by holding the Kishi government responsible for the failure of the trade agreement and, secondly, to attempt to influence the conservative party to adopt a pro-Peking stance through business' backers of the party.⁴⁶ In both cases it failed, and Sino-Japanese relations on both the economic and quasi diplomatic level sank to token levels until 1961.

During 1961, while Prime Minister Ikeda's government was pursuing its "low posture" in international affairs, the PRC abruptly changed direction and signaled her intention to resume trade relations. (This action was, in all probability, influenced by the economic necessities arising out of the Sino-Soviet split.) The Chinese announced that trade could be conducted on two levels. The first level was with "friendly firms" recommended by Japanese leftists. The second and more significant

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 500.

⁴⁵ The actual pretext for cancellation was the destruction of PRC flag at a Nagasaki stamp exhibit by a Japanese student.

⁴⁶ George P. Jan, "Japan's Trade with Communist China," Asian Survey, IX No. 12 (December 1969), p. 910.

was "Memorandum trade." The purpose of Memorandum trade was to put friendly firms trade on a large and organized basis. To this effect, Takasaki Tansunosuke, former Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry, signed a five year barter agreement with Liao Chen-chi, President of the China-Japan Friendship Society. This semi-official agreement is important not so much because of the value of the trade involved (friendly firms trade exceeded Memorandum trade by a wide margin) but because the agreement represented implied acceptance of China's "three political principles" for Sino-Japanese relations. These were that Japan (1) would not be hostile toward China and (2) would not participate in the "two Chinas" plot and (3) that the Japanese government would not obstruct steps toward normalization of relations with China.⁴⁷

While semi-official in character, the Memorandum trade agreement represented a step toward normalization of relations. Under the terms of two level trade, Sino-Japanese trade expanded rapidly from \$47.6 million in 1961 to \$625.3 million in 1969--a thirteenfold increase.⁴⁸

In 1963, economic and quasi diplomatic relations with the PRC reached a new high. In August, the Japanese government granted an export license for the sale of a \$20 million vinylon plant by the Kurashik Rayon Company to the China National Technical Import Corporation on a deferred payment basis. Payment was guaranteed by the Export-Import Bank of Japan. The net effect of the sale was a form of foreign aid to the Mainland government which could be interpreted as de facto recognition.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 911-912.

⁴⁸ Donald C. Hellmann, Japan in the Postwar East Asian International System (McLean, Va., 1969), p. 28 and Emmerson, p. 240.

With the exception of opposition to the diplomatic privileges granted the PRC trade mission in 1958, the Nationalist government had been officially ignoring the Japanese trade with the Mainland. The terms of the vinylon plant deal, combined with the return to the Mainland of a minor communist official who defected and then retracted his defection, perpetuated a serious crisis in relations with the Nationalist government. The Nationalist Ambassador to Japan resigned and the Charge d'Affairs was recalled. In addition, Taiwan cut off all purchases in Japan.

This precipitated the usual crisis within the conservative Liberal Democratic party. Because of the relative strength of the pro-Taiwan membership of the mainstream faction (The four factions comprising the Sato mainstream provided over 60 percent of the membership of the Pro Taiwan Asian Affairs Study Group when it was founded in 1966.), Yoshida Shigeru was resurrected from semi-retirement and sent on a mission to Taipei to mollify the Nationalists. Subsequently, he signed a letter promising that Japan would not again use Export-Import credits to finance trade with the Mainland. The crises subsided.

Ikeda retired in late 1964, and the new government of Sato Eisaku adhered to the terms of the Yoshida letter, refusing to grant Export-Import credits for the sale of another vinylon plant and a freighter. Sato did try to find maneuvering room by declaring that the letter was private and hence not binding on the government during a speech on August 3, 1965. However, the policy of not granting Export-Import credits was continued. To do otherwise would seriously shake the mainstream factional alliance.

Trade had increased steadily with both the Mainland and Nationalist Taiwan during the Sato era. In March 1968, Memorandum trade with the PRC

agreement was renewed. As a condition of renewal, the unofficial negotiators accepted outright Peking's "three political principles" implied in the original Liao-Takasaki Memorandum. The Sato government was quick to repudiate acceptance of these principles but, at the same time, again noted that the Yoshida letter re Export-Import credits was only a personal document and the government would consider credits on a case basis. While keeping this option open, the government has never been able to use it since it lacks factional support on the issue in the face of certain Nationalist Chinese opposition.

Nonetheless, as the 1960's drew to a close, Sino-Japanese trade was approaching a billion dollars a year while trade with Taiwan was running slightly ahead of this. In addition, Japanese business had invested heavily in Taiwan.

Japan's policy of separating economics and trade with the Taiwan government has payed off in economic terms. But, the contradictions of the Japanese political process have made it impossible to adopt any policy toward the Mainland beyond the vaguely expressed hope of eventually achieving political peace and commercial intercourse.

JAPAN AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EAST ASIA: THE 1970'S

Bipolarism and Regional Multipolarity

During the early part of the 1960's, seemingly little noticed in the official circles of the Japanese government, a regional multipolarity emerged in East Asia. China's independent nuclear capability and her border clashes with the USSR had, by the end of the decade, confirmed that this multipolarity was a permanent fixture; and, toward the end of the 1960's, discussion of what direction Japan's defense and security policy should take in the face of this new regional balance had become increasingly realistic.

When the Chinese exploded their first nuclear device in 1964, the Japanese government, while recognizing the fact, minimized its importance,¹ and Prime Minister Sato was to state at a press conference on January 13, 1965, that "the existing Security Treaty takes all possible contingencies into consideration. I think that it is because this Security Treaty exists that Japan has not become nervous about China's nuclear test."²

A year later, in a study prepared for the Prime Minister's office by the Cabinet Research Bureau, the authors concluded that, though Communist China would have ICBMs by 1975, these would be no direct threat to Japan because of the U.S. and Soviet interests in maintaining a stable world balance of power and China's preoccupation with domestic problems. The only foreseeable threat Japan might face would be to her internal security from Communist Chinese-instigated insurgency.³

¹John Welfield, Japan and Nuclear China (Canberra, 1970), p. 2.

²Tokyo Shimbun (January 20, 1965); cited in Ibid., p. 3.

³Olson, pp. 129-132.

By late 1967, the Japanese were sufficiently aware of the emerging multipolarity for the Economic Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry to note that Soviet motives in desiring Japanese participation in Siberian development were probably "to remove Japan from the umbrella of the United States and at the same time to encircle China."⁴

The move toward a more realistic discussion of defense and security matters has accompanied Japan's increased status as a world economic power. But, while the level of rhetoric and discussion became more realistic, reflecting a recognition of multipolarity in East Asia, had the policy of the Japanese government toward defense and security matters changed?

In November 1969, Prime Minister Sato gave public expression Japan's security interests in a joint communique with President Nixon issued after a series of meetings discussing the "present international situation" and Okinawa's reversion to Japanese administration. The communique states that:

The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security The Prime Minister said that maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan.

In light of the current situation and the prospects in the Far East, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that they highly valued the role played by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in maintaining the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, and they affirmed the intention of the two governments firmly to maintain the Treaty on the basis of mutual trust and common evaluation of the international situation.

⁴Olson, p. 129.

. . . the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of his government that the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East and, therefore, the security of the countries of the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan.⁵

Clearly, the Prime Minister was on record that Japan's security rested on more than just the "self defense" of the home islands. He made the extent to which Japan would go to protect her interests explicit in a companion speech to the National Press Club.

Because of the prior consultation agreement, there has always been some question as to whether Japan would respond affirmatively to a request for the use of facilities in Japan in the event of hostilities outside Japan proper. Since the prior consultation provision would apply to bases on Okinawa, Sato specifically addressed this question:

. . . in the real international world it is impossible to adequately maintain the security of Japan without international peace and security of the Far East. This is where the second objective of the Japan-United States Security Treaty comes to the foreground--the cooperation of Japan and the United States in the form of the use of facilities and areas in Japan by United States forces under Article VI thereof for the security of the Far East in a broader context.

And it would be in accord with our national interest for us to determine our response to prior consultation regarding the use of these facilities and areas in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East, including Japan.

In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for United States forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas within Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Government of Japan towards prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

⁵U.S. Congress, Okinawa, pp. 1426-27.

The maintenance of peace in the Taiwan area is also a most important factor for our own security. . . . (If an attack occurred that came under the purview of the US-Republic of China treaty) it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East, including Japan.

Therefore, in view of our national interest, we would deal with the situation on the basis of the foregoing recognition, in connection with the fulfillment by the United States of its defense obligations.⁶

When closely examined, the Nixon-Sato communique and the Press Club speech say nothing new about Japan's defense and security policy. The Japanese government had always held that Taiwan and especially Korea had been important to Japan's security (see page 21). The two documents reaffirmed the Japanese belief that the operational mission of U.S. bases and troops in Japan and Okinawa is to provide for the security of Japan by acting as a police force in the areas of East Asia which are essential to Japan's security.

The same policy statement is found in the White Paper on Defense issued in October 1970. The paper, which created quite a stir upon publication, noted:

The defense of Japan means specifically the effort to maintain peace in and around Japan and protection of the nation's culture, freedom, democracy, stability and prosperity. . . . The possibilities of armed conflicts in the (Far East) are expected to be influenced greatly by the moves of China which is developing nuclear arms, the withdrawal of British forces from Asia and increased Soviet naval presence and the way the Vietnam war will be settled. . . . The Constitution does not prohibit use of force as a means to defend the country. . . . Japan's basic defense goal is to develop a strictly defensive capability.

. . . This imposes restraints on the quality and quantity of Japanese armaments. . . . Japanese rely on the United States for deterrence against a nuclear war or for strategic operations in areas outside Japanese territory in the event of direct aggression. (Japan's armed forces) will not be sent overseas.⁷

⁶ Ibid., p. 1430.

⁷ White Paper on Defense as summarized by the Japan Times; cited in Survival (January 1971), p. 5. Commentators have suggested that both ABM and ASW weapons would fit this description.

While the White Paper states that Japan's 22 year old security policy has not essentially changed (i.e., Japan still relies on the United States for "deterrence" and "strategic operations" outside of the home islands.), the paper represents a growing realization that multipolar forces are at work in East Asia. Publication of the paper itself, the first in the post-war period, indicates that public discussion of defense and security matters is now respectable. There is, in the words of former Ambassador Edwin Reischauer, "a growing feeling that the country can't avoid the international responsibilities that require a strong military force."⁸

The White Paper also introduced a new element in defense thinking--the nuclear arms issue. The paper stated that: "Theoretically speaking, it would not be impossible to possess small nuclear weapons, the capability of which is within the minimum limits required for self-defense and which would not cause other nations to fear the threat of aggression."⁹ This statement is qualified by the assertion that "Japan maintains her three non-nuclear principles (namely, not to manufacture nor to possess nuclear weapons and not to allow them into its territory)" and relies "on the United States for deterrence against a nuclear war."¹⁰

The importance of the inclusion of statements concerning the acceptability of nuclear weapons is heightened by events taking place in Japan's economic sector. To meet power requirements she is developing a large scale

⁸ Japan Times (March 1, 1970); cited in Mendel, p. 1049.

⁹ White Paper on Defense as summarized by the Japan Times; cited in Survival (January 1971), p. 5. Commentators have suggested that both ABM and ASW weapons would fit this description.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 3-5.

nuclear generating capacity. Four nuclear power plants are in operation and nine more are planned by the mid-1970's.¹¹ Because of this large requirement for enriched uranium and dependence on imports, she is also developing breeder reactors with the first experimental reactor scheduled to go critical in 1973.¹² By mid-decade, Japan should have a modest plutonium 239 production capacity which could be put to weapons production. Japan also possesses delivery system technology in her successful Mu rocket which has been compared to the U.S. Minuteman.¹³ Japan's space program plans to increase lift capacity by procuring Thor Delta rocket technology from the United States.¹⁴

For reasons which are both economic and political, Japan has not ratified the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty she signed February 3, 1970.¹⁵ Economic objections revolve around the International Atomic Energy Agency inspection requirement. Strict inspection procedures for Japan's domestic nuclear power industry might interrupt power supplies, and there is fear of industrial spying by inspectors. Political arguments are tinged with a spirit of independence in world affairs as well as stated explanations that China and France have not signed.

¹¹Emmerson, p. 329.

¹²Ibid., p. 333.

¹³Ibid., p. 319.

¹⁴"Japan's Rise in Aerospace," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 95 No. 18 (November 1, 1971), p. 65.

¹⁵Intraparty wrangling within the Liberal Democratic party delayed signature for over a year. While Sato and his faction favored signature, the LDP was badly split on the issue. The party squabble was not patched up until early 1970. Interestingly, opposition parties all are against ratification.

At about the time that the Security Treaty was automatically extended, government spokesmen began to speak of "self reliant defense" and the Liberal Democratic party publicly adopted the position that the "self defense (be) given primary importance over the security treaty 'which shall be regarded as supplementary'." ¹⁶

Discussion of the nuclear issue, the rhetorical shift in emphasis on the function of the Self Defense Forces, events such as the ritual suicide of the rightest novelist Mishima Yukio and a recent spat of right wing activity coupled with forces at work pressuring Japan to an active role in East Asia have led some observers to conclude that Japan has changed her defense and security policy in the light of the new regional multipolarity. ¹⁷

The weight of evidence, however, supports the opposite view that Japan's policy has not essentially changed, only the options have become frighteningly more attainable. On June 22, 1970, Japan and the United States quietly renewed the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

The Japanese government statement accompanying the announcement of automatic renewal presented the view "that the Nation has enjoyed peace in the turbulence of the world today and has achieved an unprecedented economic prosperity and improvements in the people's living (as a result of the 1960 Security Treaty, and this) bears out the wisdom of the national choice made on the course of external policy." ¹⁸

While the treaty may now be terminated by either party after giving a year's notice of intention, there is no evidence that the Japanese are in a hurry to either terminate or renegotiate in the near future. As late as January 7, 1972, Prime Minister Sato told President Nixon, during

¹⁶"LDP Policy Position on National Defense," Asian Almanac (July 25, 1970), p. 4078.

¹⁷For example see Nikamura Koji, "The Samurai Spirit," Far East Economic Review, LXXIV No. 42 (October 16, 1971), pp. 22-25.

¹⁸Asian Almanac (July 25, 1970), p. 4068

their San Clemente meeting, that Japan would not abrogate the Security Treaty even as the price for favorable normalization of relations with the Chinese.¹⁹

Treaty extension on terms which are the same as those negotiated in 1960 may have been necessary because of the factional nature of Japanese politics (to maintain the status quo is the safest political move) and a deeply held feeling that the Security Treaty has served Japan's interests well, but it also represents the dilemma underlying Japan's postwar defense and security policies. Japan's policy makers must consider her American-imposed Constitution.

The Constitution Problem

At the root of Japan's difficulties in formulating a defense and security policy is Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution. In it, the "Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes . . . the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."²⁰

The meaning of Article 9 circumscribes Japan's entire postwar policy. On March 30, 1959, a Tokyo District Court handed down a decision which undermined it in its entirety. The issue came up in 1957 when several Japanese citizens were arrested for trespassing at the U.S. Tachikawa air base. The Tokyo District Court found them not guilty of violating the law because the law under which they were convicted was illegally enacted in that it implemented the 1951 Security Treaty which was itself unconstitutional because it provided for the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan which

¹⁹ Asian Almanac (February 5, 1972), p. 5004.

²⁰ SCAP, p. 102.

constituted war potential forbidden by Article 9. While this decision only considered the validity of the law under which the trespassers were tried, its practical effect was to judge the Security Treaty unconstitutional and invalidate Japan's entire security policy.

The Supreme Court, in its only decision dealing with Article 9,²¹ reversed the Tokyo Court decision but confined itself rigorously to the constitutionality of the law under which they were tried and related issue of the constitutionality of the Security Treaty. It did not touch on the extremely sensitive issue of the constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces.

The formal judgment stated that although Japan:

. . . renounces what is termed war potential; naturally, the above in no way denies the inherent right of self defense, which our country possesses as a sovereign nation, and the pacificism of our Constitution has never provided for either defenselessness or nonresistance. . . . (thus) it must be said that it is proper that our country, in the exercise of an inherent national function, be able to take the measures necessary for self-defense so that we can maintain our own peace and security and preserve our own existence. That is to say, we, the Japanese people, under article 9, paragraph 2, of the Constitution, do not maintain what is termed war potential in the same article, but we have determined to preserve our peace and security because the insufficiency of our nations defensive strength produced thereby is not compensated for by trusting to . . . 'the justice and faith of the peaceloving peoples of the world.' . . . If there are to be guarantees of the security of our country in order to preserve its peace and security, it is natural that we be able to select, in order to achieve such aims, appropriate measures and methods regarded as suitable under existing international conditions. Article 9 of the Constitution in no way prohibits a request to another country for security guarantees for the maintenance of peace and safety of our country.²²

²¹The question of the constitutionality of the police reserves had been raised in 1952 in a lawsuit by the Secretary General of the Social Democratic party. This court refused to hear the case and dismissed it on a legal technicality.

²²Hanreishu, XIII No. 12, 3225 (Criminal); translated in John M. Maki, Court and Constitution in Japan (Seattle, 1964), p. 303.

This stated, the high court skirted the issue of the meaning of "war potential" on which District Court Judge Date had based his lower court decision, stating that:

. . . entirely apart from the question of whether or not paragraph 2 of the said article (Article 9) prohibits the maintenance of war potential for the purpose of self-defense, it must be understood that the war potential prohibited by the said provision is that over which our country can exercise rights of command and control, that is, it stipulates the war potential of our own country.²³

The court then held that "retention of United States Armed Forces certainly be in accord with the intent of Article 9, of Article 98, paragraph 2, and of the Preamble of the Constitution."²⁴

What the court did not do is rule on the question of whether Japan could possess "war potential" for self defense.

Consecutive Japanese governments have held the position that the renunciation of war contained in Article 9 of the Constitution does not prohibit either the right of self defense or the maintenance of the means to effect his defense.

As early as 1950, in defense of the establishment of the National Police Reserve, the Government used the argument that "it was permissible to devise means of national defense with forces that were not equipped to conduct war."²⁵ This philosophy underlies the growth of the Self Defense Forces and is explicitly stated in explanations of their mission and capabilities. The 1970 Defense White Paper went to great pains to

²³Ibid., p. 304.

²⁴Ibid., p. 307.

²⁵Yoshida, Memoirs, p. 193. Development of this line of reasoning is attributed to then Minister of Justice Takeo Ohashi.

note that the SDF "will remain strategically on the defensive. Therefore, the size of the defense forces, the kinds of equipment and the types of actions to be taken to meet aggression are strictly limited to the extent necessary for such self defense."²⁶

A significant percentage of Japanese experts on public law take an opposite view. A 1964 poll among experts indicated that 88 percent felt that the government interpretation and existence of the SDF was unconstitutional. This same poll indicated a strong ideological bias among the same group, with 70% favoring unarmed neutrality over revising the constitution.²⁷ This considered, the results of the survey still indicate the existence of a strong body of legal opinion in conflict with the government's view.

The unanimous Sunakawa decision clearly supports the Government view that Japan has the inherent right of self defense. What is less clear is the question of whether Japan can maintain war potential (i.e., the Self Defense Forces) for self defense.

In the decision, no less than ten justices filed supplementary opinions. While all the supplementary opinions agreed that Japan has a right to self defense, a number went to great pains to distinguish between the maintenance of armed forces under control of Japan and those under control of the United States. The implication seems to be that these justices were not convinced of the constitutionality of the SDF. Nonetheless, in the formal judgment there is evidence that the court is inclined to uphold the constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces. If "the pacifism of our

²⁶ White Paper on Defense, p. 4.

²⁷ Naoki Kobayashi, "The Japanese People and the Peace Article," Japan Quarterly, XII No. 4 (October-December 1966), p. 447.

Constitution has never provided for either defenselessness or non-resistance"²⁸ then it seems that the court did not wish to deny Japan of whatever means are necessary to effect self defense.

By strictly limiting itself to the narrow legal issues involved and not addressing wider (more vital) issues, the court did not clear up the issues surrounding Article 9, and it has continued to be a real, though subdued, issue in Japanese politics. As part of the price for unification of the conservative parties, the Liberal Democrats in 1955 pledged to amend the Constitution. In 1956, a Cabinet Commission on the Constitution was established to make recommendations.

This commission conducted eight years of hearings and deliberations before issuing its report in July 1964. In the report, the commissioners agreed that Japan had a basic right to defend herself and that, therefore, the existence of self defense forces was constitutional. A minority felt that Article 9 could be interpreted as allowing Japan the right not only to maintain self defense forces but also to participate in regional defense pacts and, therefore, did not need revision. The majority, while agreeing with the minority interpretation, held that Article 9 should be revised because it was ambiguous, divisive of popular support and undesirable internationally.²⁹

There has been strong support for constitutional revision within the conservative party. Prime Ministers Kishi, Ikeda and Sao all strongly

²⁸Hanreishu, XIII No. 12, 3225 (Criminal), p. 303.

²⁹Robert Ward, "The Commission on the Constitution and Prospects for Constitutional Change in Japan," Journal of Asian Studies XXIV No. 3 (May 1965), pp. 412-413.

supported efforts for revision before they were elected to party presidency. But, once they achieved dominance in the party structure, they ceased to aggressively push for constitutional revision, and considerations of interparty factional balance has outweighed their ideological commitment.³⁰ There simply has not been enough pressure for revision to cause the mainstream factions to press the issue. The safety valve preventing this pressure from building up to the explosion point has been the steady growth and general acceptance of the Self Defense Forces without explicit court approval and the security afforded by the Japan-U.S. security treaties.

The constitutional prohibition of the right of belligerency has much deeper implications than just the limitation of the size or equipment of armed forces. To paraphrase Mr. Justice Sutherland,³¹ powers of external sovereignty, including the right of belligerency are necessary concomitants of nationality. The rights of any nation in this area must necessarily be equal to the other nations of the international family. If they were not, the nation would not be completely sovereign. The real heart of Japan's central problem in defense and international relations lies exactly in this area. Article 9 of Japan's constitution renounces not only war but a very important part of national sovereignty.³²

³⁰ Haruhiro Fukui, Party in Power The Japanese Liberal Democrats and Policy Making (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), pp. 215-222.

³¹ "United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corporation," 299 U.S. 304; 81L. Ed. 255; Sup. Ct. 216. 1936.

³² Japan is not the only nation to renounce war. The French constitution of 1791 (Ch 6) noted that France "will renounce all war with the objective of conquest and never resort to arms against the freedom of any nation." It appears though that the war the French renounced was a war of aggression and not the right of belligerency of the state.

Because of the uncertainty over the issue, Japan stands at a disadvantage, an inequality, in dealing with other nations--a point that surely cannot be missed by practitioners of realpolitik in Peking or Moscow. This point is well illustrated in Japan's relations with South Korea. For much of the 1950's, the South Koreans established a closed fishing zone--the Rhee line--in the Korean Straits and the Sea of Japan. Japanese fishing boats were seized or sunk with impunity in international waters. Having renounced belligerency the Japanese stood by helplessly, able only to complain and negotiate for cessation at a disadvantage.

The manner in which the Japan-U.S. security treaties were negotiated and the nature of the security contract between the two countries is an effect of this self-imposed prohibition. This, of course, is not to say that the security contract would have been different if Article 9 didn't exist. The point is that because of Article 9 from the Japanese viewpoint the nature of the security treaty is the only possible solution to their problem.

Discussion of revision of Article 9 in Japan has generally centered around the question of the constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces; the wider implications of renunciation of the right of belligerency has received scant consideration. But here lies the real complication in efforts at stabilizing relationships in East Asia.

The Japanese could begin their discussion by looking at the simple truth of Justice Sutherland's comments. They probably will not; the issue is too emotional, too divisive for that. A peculiarly Japanese solution has been suggested by Mr. Chief Justice Tanaka in his supplementary opinion to the Sunakawa decision. He noted:

The fact that as a general rule nations possess the right of self-defense for the sake of their survival is widely accepted. . . . The decision of the means to be selected and the degree of perfection and the structure of the power of self-defense must consider world conditions at the time and other circumstances; it is a purely political question which is left to the discretion of the government. . . . Moreover, a country's self-defense is a moral responsibility in international society. Today the relationship of mutual solidarity among the various peoples had broadened and deepened to the point that a crisis for one people necessarily and directly affects other peoples. . . . today there no longer exists the concept of self-defense in the strict meaning of the term. The connection is simply this: self-defense is the defense of others; defense of others is self-defense. Accordingly, it must be recognized that though it be defense of one's own country or cooperation in the defense of other countries, each country bears a responsibility.³³

This solution to the problem of the powers of external sovereignty inherent in the right of belligerency of the State could provide an effective way to solve the problems of security inherent in Japan's Constitution. Whether Japan solves the constitution problem in this manner or by squarely recognizing the truth of Justice Sutherland's observation probably will not make much difference in the long run.

While constitutional issues have been debated, Japan has built up a fair sized modern conventional army. In this effort, she has been encouraged and aided by the United States. The size and mission of this force has been circumscribed by the government's interpretation of the meaning of Article 9, and they have looked to the security relationship with the United States to provide for their interests in the Far East. Armies exist to serve the interests of the state. The crises will come when in the course of diplomacy the Japanese realize that they suffer the

³³ Hanreishu, pp. 309-310.

disadvantage of having renounced the right of belligerency. What course will the world's second or third largest economic power then pursue? It seems that unless the Japanese come to grips with the constitution problem in the near future they run the almost certain risk of grave constitutional crises at the worst moment and the distinct possibility of being unable to cope with the real problems of the emerging multipolar world which will lead to the war they renounced in 1947.

Pressures for Participation

Despite the constitution problem and the inhibiting effect of factional party politics, there are pressures at work pushing Japan toward a realistic participation in the multipolar East Asian world.

Japan is the economic giant of the region. She is the number one or number two largest trading partner of every country in the region, except the USSR. By the middle of the decade of the 1960's, Japan had cornered 36.4% of the trade of South Korea, 33.4% of Taiwan's trade, 12.4% of Mainland China's trade and 60% of North Korea's trade.³⁴ An important aspect of this trade is Japan's growing dependence on imports of items she previously exported. In 1966, Japan became a net importer of raw silk and a year later of cotton yarn.³⁵ This dependency on imports from less-developed nations, principally Taiwan and South Korea, increases interest in their stability. Japan is also the largest dispenser of economic assistance in Asia. In 1968, total Japanese economic aid to less-developed countries exceeded one billion dollars (\$1.049 billion), \$1,263 billion in 1969 and \$1.8 billion in 1970.

³⁴Hellmann, Japan in the Postwar East Asian International System, p. 26.

³⁵Marius B. Jansen, "The United States and Japan in the 1970's," in Japanese American Relations in the 1970's, Gerald L. Curtis, ed., p. 42.

Japan's total aid should surpass that of the United States by mid 1970; i.e., 1% of projected \$400 billion GNP. Of this aid, approximately half is extended to Asian nations: \$500.3 million in 1968, \$559.0 million in 1969 and \$847.4 million in 1970.³⁶ She has also taken the leading role in the Asian Development Bank, matching the capital investment of the United States. In addition, Japan is a member of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) and has hosted or participated in numerous development conferences.

Japan has taken pains to avoid political inferences from her membership in regional associations such as ASPAC. This has created difficulties. A good example is the recent Djakarta Conference. Japan was reluctant to participate because of its regional military connotations; yet, fortunately, the conference produced a sufficiently bland statement to preclude the necessity of positive action. What Japan's response would have been if the conference had instead recommended intervention in Cambodia is hard to predict.

Nonetheless, with Japan's large regional involvement on an economic basis level, it is impossible to see how the Japanese can but be interested in the political stability of East and Southeast Asia. Should Japan be called upon for aid by one of her trading partners, she would suffer immense loss of influence and risk political and economic isolation if she failed to respond.

The East Asian country with which Japan's interests most likely might clash is Mainland China. Japan's interest in the stability of the East and Southeast Asia has not been lost on Peking. Chinese apprehension over the form this interest might take is heightened by her view that the Nixon Doctrine shifts responsibility for defense in Asia from American to Japanese

³⁶Emmerson, pp. 290-292.

hands. This apprehension was not helped by President Nixon's statement of the role of the Japanese expressed in his February 1970 state of the world address:

. . . our cooperation with Japan will be crucial to our efforts to help other Asian nations develop in peace. Japan's partnership with us will be a key to the success of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia.³⁷

Prime Minister Sato's fall 1969 explicit statement of Japan's security interests further alarmed the Chinese.

During the fall of 1969 and through 1971, the "revival of Japanese militarism" became a major regional foreign policy concern for the Communist Chinese. A content analysis of the Peking Review revealed that, after the Sato communique, the most visible topic shifted from American Indochina imperialism to Japan.³⁸ Prior to this period, what attention that was payed to Japan shifted from Soviet-Japanese "collaboration" to Japanese-American relations, charges of militarism and Japanese regional security involvement. The Chinese see the Japanese as inheriting the position of the United States as the prop of regional stability. "This growing tension with nuclear-armed China heightens the need to increase contact with the Mainland.

The reversion of the Ryukyus on May 15, 1972, puts Japan closer to the center of regional multipolar politics. It poses two serious security problems. First, Japan has assumed responsibility for defense of a large new area. Initial arrangements call for gradual stationing of Self Defense Forces in the Okinawa area and assumption of complete responsibility for

³⁷"U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's A New Strategy for Peace, A Report by Richard M. Nixon to the Congress (February 18, 1970)," Dept. of State Bulletin, LXII (March 9, 1970), p. 294.

³⁸William Saywell, "Japan's Role in the Pacific and China's Response," International Journal, XXVI (Summer 1971), p. 508.

defense of a large new area. Initial arrangements call for gradual stationing of Self Defense Forces in the Okinawa area and assumption of complete responsibility for defense prior to July 1, 1973.³⁹ Second, reversion presents Japan with a new complication in her relationship with China. Both Chinas claim the Senkaku (Tiaoyu) Islands which were returned to Japanese administration. Reaction to the reversion agreement was prompt and strong by both Chinese governments. The People's Daily denounced the "dirty deal" and warned that "no insidious strategims . . . can alter the fact that the Taioyu and other islands are an inalienable part of China's sacred territory."⁴⁰ The issue is further complicated by the fact that possible major oil deposits have been discovered in the vicinity of the Senkakus.

The Japanese, sensitive to territorial issues, flatly stated on March 5, 1971, that the Senkakus belonged to Japan; and, thus there was no question of negotiation over their jurisdiction with the Chinese,⁴¹ and they have pledged that the Japanese coast guard will patrol the area to prevent encroachment.⁴² Because of the sovereignty issue, the United States, in returning the Senkakus to Japanese administration, stated that it was returning them without judgment on sovereignty.⁴³ The Japanese are now faced with their first frontal confrontation with the Chinese over an issue both countries are extremely sensitive to--the territorial one.

³⁹Asian Almanac (October 30, 1971), p. 4861.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 4862.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 4855.

⁴²New York Times (April 23, 1972), p. 17.

⁴³Ibid., p. 17.

Whatever the Japanese do in normalizing relations with Mainland China, it will involve them more deeply in regional politics and pose security problems.

Japan must still solve the problem of the two Chinas. She supported efforts to gain de facto recognition of both Chinas during the United Nations admission procedure for Mainland China.

From a strictly security oriented view, Japan may prefer to have the Nationalist buffer between her and the Mainland. This was at least implicitly implied in the 1969 joint Nixon-Sato communique where maintenance of peace in Taiwan was termed "most important" to Japanese security interests. The issue is complicated by Japanese trade with both Chinas. Japanese trade with Taiwan in 1970 amounted to close to a billion dollars (\$953,000,000). Trade with mainland China amounted to about \$825,000,000 in the same year.⁴⁴ Trade is quite favorable to Japan, running a 3 to 1 balance in her favor. Communist Chinese trade policies have kept the balance of trade with the Mainland at much less favorable levels.

The issue is complicated by the existence of the 1952 Peace Treaty with the Nationalist government. President Chiang, on June 8, 1968, himself announced that "if the Japanese government should decide to establish diplomatic ties with the Chinese Communists, then Japan would have to break off its diplomatic ties with the Republic of China first. In such an eventuality, I would declare the Peace Treaty null and void."⁴⁵ In this eventuality, the Japanese would have to renegotiate a peace treaty with the Peking

⁴⁴Emmerson, p. 267.

⁴⁵Gene T. Hsiao, "The Role of Trade in China's Diplomacy with Japan," The Dynamics of China's Foreign Relations, Jerome Cohen ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), p. 53.

government, and this would undoubtedly involve issues of reparations, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and sovereignty over the Ryukyus.

Pressure to come to grips with the new regional multipolarity also is felt from the Soviet Union. As a result of a policy of general detente, the USSR has been pressuring the Japanese for the peace treaty which was not signed in 1956. Deadlock on the Northern territories issues is still the major point blocking improved relations. Soviet laws have not changed appreciably and no resolution on the issue was obtained during talks between Foreign Minister Aichi and Soviet Premier Kosygin in September 1969.⁴⁶ Since the territorial issue is still able to create a political crisis, normalization here is probably dependent on Soviet willingness to compromise.

Because of the special relationship built up over the past quarter century, Japan is most sensitive to pressures from the United States.

The United States is exerting pressure upon Japan for more active participation in multipolar East Asia. The now famous Nixon doctrine is a subtle form of this. At the same time that Prime Minister Sato was reasserting his faith in the old relationship, Mr. Nixon was enunciating the policy that:

The United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. . . . We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. . . . In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.⁴⁷

The signal being flashed is that the bipolar period is over and, as a

⁴⁶ Asian Almanac (October 6, 1969), p. 3597.

⁴⁷ "Address to the Nation by Richard M. Nixon" (November 3, 1969), Dept. of State Bulletin, LXI (November 24, 1969), p. 440.

result, the United States is reducing her commitment to act as the physical prop for stability in the East Asian area. In view of the dependence on the U.S. to provide for Japan's security interests outside the home islands, this signal should have provided an incentive for a rethinking of defense and security matters. But, its impact has been diluted by the decision of both governments to quietly renew the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security when it expired on June 22, 1970.

During 1971, the United States provided additional incentive for participation in regional affairs in the form of the "Nixon shocks." The July 17 announcement of the President's China visit caught the Japanese government off guard. Relations were also strained by the various "dollar shocks." The year started with Japan embroiled in the textile problem which finally was settled, forcing a 30% cutback in Japanese manufacturing. The net effect of the August dollar flotation and 10% surcharge was to force a reduction in the planned 10% growth of Japan's GNP to about 7%.⁴⁸

Prime Minister Sato, in his 1971 New Year's Day message, noted that "Japan has no diplomacy unless we come to grips with the China problem."⁴⁹ The shocks of 1971 are forcing rethinking of the question of Japan's relations with China. Not surprisingly, the question of a new policy quickly became embroiled in intraparty conservative politics, which are sharpened by the expected retirement of Prime Minister Sato. At the beginning of the year, only the anti-mainstream Miki faction was actively supporting a policy of recognizing Mainland China as the only legitimate government of

⁴⁹ New York Times (January 8, 1971); quoted in Emmerson, p. 387.

China. After the "Nixon shocks," mainstream leader Nakasone and some minor factions switched support to this position. At the conclusion of Nixon's visit, Sato's main supporter and Foreign Minister, faction leader Fukuda, announced support for recognition of the Mainland government. The "dollar shocks" also seriously weakened the position of Mr. Tanaka, the head of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, a Sato stalwart who is possibly in line for the Prime Ministership. Whatever the outcome of the intrparty strife, it seems certain that some changes in direction of conservative thought on the question of normalization of relations will result.

But, for Japan to take a position of leadership (or even cope successfully) with the new regional multipolarity in East Asia is going to take more than a decision to recognize the Mainland Chinese government. If Japan is to effectively cope with the new regional realities, she must be able to negotiate equally with the great regional powers. To do so will require a rethinking of defense and security matters. To live in the uncertain East Asian world, where resort to force has been so common in the past, without the military strength to protect her interests would be anomalous.

CONCLUSION

For twenty years, the cornerstone of Japan's defense and security policy has been the bilateral security treaty with the United States. The basic outline of this agreement was not cooked up whole in Washington and served to the Japanese; rather, its Japanese origins go back as early as 1947. Since then it has served the security interests of both countries. From the Japanese viewpoint, it has served not only as a deterrent against outright aggression but to provide for Japanese security interests in East Asia.

While not publicly stressing the latter point, the Japanese Government has vigorously defended its policy choice, stressing the economic benefits of a low defense budget and the security gained under the American umbrella. The value of the treaty has not been lost on the public either. Polls conducted just prior to automatic extension of the treaty in 1970 indicated that extension was favored two to one over abrogation by the man in the street.¹

The treaty system has two side effects which deserve realistic discussion inside Japan. First, the protection afforded by the treaty system has permitted the Japanese to subordinate efforts at normalization of relations with neighboring states to the vicissitudes of factional party politics without seriously threatening the country's security interests. Because of the security enjoyed under the alliance, there has been no real pressure to come to grips with the complex security questions involved in these issues.

¹Douglas H. Mendel, "Japanese Defense in the 1970's: The Public View," Asian Survey X No. 12 (December 1970), p. 1059.

Major foreign policy decisions, especially those of a security nature, are divisive in terms of factional unity and provide the opposition parties with an issue. For this reason, they are avoided if possible; and when they cannot be avoided they are not considered on their objective merits. Rather, they are considered in terms of the impact on factional politics.

The second major side effect of the security treaty system is that the system by providing, in Mr. Sato's words, for "all possible contingencies" has obscured the deeper constitutional problems involved in Japan's security policy. The Supreme Court decision in the Sunakawa case, while deciding that the constitution does not bar the right of self defense and judging the treaty system to be a constitutional exercise of this right, did not settle the larger issue of whether the country could maintain war potential for self defense and whether the country did (or could) renounce the sovereignty implicit in the right of belligerency. The net effect of the security treaty has been to allow the Japanese to avoid these more basic issues.

Given the factional nature of party politics and the divisiveness of the constitutional issues surrounding Article 9, the course in defense and security policy charted in 1947 was probably the wisest one. The country's remarkable economic progress is in part attributable to the low material cost of resources for defense and the political stability provided by the general acceptance of the policy.

But, if this great economic power is to become a great regional and world power, it must soon come to grips with the great questions which the security treaty has permitted to remain in the background. As we have seen, there are pressures at work to move Japan toward a reassessment of defense

and security policy. The most important of these is the emerging multi-polarity in the world. The present Japan-United States security system is founded upon the assumption that world politics is essentially bipolar. In the bipolar world of the late 1940's and 1950's, Japan could safely risk the assumption that the security of Japan was essential to the security of the United States and base her policies on this fact.

The security of Japan is still essential to the United States. But the preeminent fact of world politics is no longer the mutual antagonism of the two nuclear armed superpowers. While there is no reason that the security treaty system cannot continue to serve Japanese interests in the new multi-polar world reality, the assurance that it will is less certain. It seems certain that, while the basic interests in Asian stability held by Japan and the United States will remain compatible, they will not necessarily be identical. This thought is implicit in the Nixon doctrine.

United States foreign policy further encourages Japan to seek new roles and normalize relationships in East Asia. The President noted this in his 1972 report to Congress on United States foreign policy for the 1970's:

. . . autonomous policies need not create strains in our relationship so long as we both recognize the need to mesh these policies. Both the autonomy and the basic harmony of our actions are implicit and essential elements in the new relationship of equality and reciprocity which we seek with Japan.²

The report to the Congress implicitly recognizes the previous statement that, while the security interests of both countries will remain compatible, they will not necessarily be identical. This undoubtedly gives some pause to

²U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's A Report to the Congress, February 9, 1972, Department of State Bulletin LXVI No. 1707 (March 13, 1972), p. 341.

Japan's leadership. Japan has assumed that the Security Treaty relationship will ensure Japan's security interests in the "Far East." A growing skepticism exists today in Japan over whether the relationship will continue to protect Japanese interests.³ The uncertain resolution of the Vietnam war and the growing detente between Washington and Peking and Moscow can't help but feed this skepticism. If this skepticism induces a new look of defense and security policy and its side effects it will be healthy. On the other hand, if this skepticism should turn to a feeling of being abandoned by the United States, it will have just the opposite effect.

There is in Japan a strong sense of nationalism and a desire to be treated as an equal. Prime Minister Yoshida's great concern in negotiating the 1952 Security Treaty was to secure recognition that Japan was negotiating as an equal and not as a dependent or vanquished nation.⁴ To the credit of Truman and Acheson, Japan was treated as an equal. This theme of nationalism and desire for equal treatment runs deep in Japanese policy. According to former Ambassador Reischauer, not to treat Japan as an equal would be the greatest possible shock.⁵

³ Douglas Mendel's latest tabulation of public opinion in his article in Asian Survey ("Japanese Defense in the 1970's: The Public View") notes that 39 percent of those sampled no longer believed that the United States would come to Japan's aid in an emergency. Thirty percent still had faith. While much of this skepticism is reflected in Socialist voters, a surprising number of LDP voters were also skeptical. Only 9 percent more LDP voters felt that the U.S. commitment was substantial than those who expressed skepticism. Some of this skepticism cannot help but be felt by the Japanese leadership.

⁴ Yoshida, Memoirs, p. 266.

⁵ Transcript of debate on abrogation of the Japanese-American Security Treaty, Public Broadcasting Service, February 1, 1972.

If the United States abrogated or drastically changed its commitment to the security alliance, Mr. Reischauer believes it would be signaling to Japan that they are in fact not an equal partner and are not worthy of the same commitment that we have made to Europe. This change in the Japan-United States relationship, real or unintended, will inexorably set the Japanese on the path of massive, probably nuclear, rearmament in order to protect their interests and prove their equality. The ghost of the Washington Naval Conference will come back to haunt us all.

The challenge and the dilemma in Japanese defense and security policy in the decade of the 1970's is to adapt to the new realities of the multi-polar world in a way that will have to look not only at what ships or guns or planes she needs but at the nature of her politics and her Constitution. This task looks as large today as economic recovery must have looked in September 1951. But, if Japan is to be a truly great nation, it must be done.

EPILOGUE

The ten months since the above essay was written have been pivotal, perhaps seminal, ones for Japanese decision makers. A number of inter-related events have served to both highlight the deficiencies in Japanese security and foreign policy making and underscore the necessity for change.

On July 5, 1972, Tanaka Kakuei was elected Prime Minister, succeeding the retiring Sato Eisaku. With Tanaka's election, foreign policy again was caught up in domestic intraparty factional politics. During the period since the announcement of President Nixon's visit to China, Sato had openly expressed his desire to visit Peking and begin the process of normalization of relations. A successful resolution of this sticky problem coming on top of Okinawa reversion would be an impressive capstone of a long political career. This desire was to remain no more than a wish for two reasons: first, because support for the Nationalists was one of the policies supported by the mainstream factional alliance and, second, because the Chinese flatly and publicly refused to deal with the Sato government, thereby hoping to influence a choice of successor.

With Sato's impending retirement, anti-mainstream factions seized upon China policy "failures" as an issue to use against the Prime Minister's handpicked successor, Fukuda Takeo. All contenders for Prime Minister now favored recognition of Peking though it should be noted that only Miki Takeo had previously supported such a policy. In the intraparty factional struggle, Tanaka deserted the Sato mainstream and announced support for a new China policy in an effort to rally support from outside the mainstream. In this, he was successful, winning 282 to 190.¹ Japan was now wedded to a

¹Seattle Post-Intelligencer (July 5, 1972), p. A1.

new China policy not because of security reasons or as the result of a rationalized policy but because of the vicissitudes of factional politics.

With the Japanese government now publicly committed to normalization, and as part of an effort to loosen Japan-U.S. ties and balance Soviet pressure, Peking quickly invited Tanaka to visit China. The event occurred September 25 to 29.

In a joint communique, Japan recognized "the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China" and both governments . . . decided upon the establishment of diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972."² The Chinese waived war indemnities, and both countries agreed to hold negotiations for conclusion of a peace treaty at a date in the future. At the same time, Japan broke relations with the Nationalists.

Does normalization of relations represent a new appreciation of realpolitik and the imperatives of the Asian scene in Japanese diplomacy? The answer is "no." The evidence suggests that Japan will continue to remain an essentially passive actor, moving in an ad hoc manner in response to external stimulus. Recognition was only possible because of the Nixon visit and, as noted above, was more a response to intraparty factional pressures than reasoned policy. The Japanese embassy in Taipei remained open for business as usual after relations were severed, and officials "purposely avoided trying to define the present status of their relations."³ The embassy finally closed, but its place has been taken by an "Exchange Association" indirectly funded by the Japanese government. This "association" confidently predicts expansion

²"Text of Chinese-Japanese Accord," New York Times (September 30, 1970), p. 12. p. 12.

³New York Times (October 8, 1972), p. 10.

of trade at a rate of 10% a year.⁴ Japan has not solved the China problem, only the players have swapped places.

Recognition of the Peoples Republic cannot help but draw Japan further into regional politics and pose security problems. The Chinese are clearly aware of the possible implications of regional involvement. An appreciation of realpolitik more than Marxist ideology is behind Chou En-lai's statement that Japan's "economic expansion is bound to bring about military expansion."⁵ Although the Japanese do not appear to fully appreciate the implications, Japan's tremendous trade aid and investment in East Asia necessarily must make her more concerned with regional political stability. Unless peace breaks out in Asia, she will necessarily need the means and the will to promote stability.

The East Asian region has not become more stable during the last 10 months. Despite recent efforts at reproachment, there is still tension between the two Koreas. Taiwan is now a question mark. Fighting continues in Indochina. The Philippines and Thailand are now combating insurgency. All these are areas where Japan has a vested interest in stability. But the most significant events of the last ten months have been changes in the Japan-US relationship which signal that Japan can no longer hold the old assumptions about the Japan-US security arrangement.

The United States physical involvement in Viet Nam had not only contributed to overall regional stability but had provided evidence of willingness of US commitment to Japan's security interests in East Asia. This involvement has ended under circumstances which probably preclude military reinvolverment

⁴New York Times (January 21, 1973), p. 54F.

⁵James Reston, Interview, Report from Red China (New York, 1971), p. 94.

in the region. In any event, the war in Vietnam has clearly demonstrated the limits of great power capacity to influence regional affairs.

As important as the security implications of US withdrawal are changes in economic relations between the two countries which have developed during the last 10 months. The Japan-US security relationship has been only part of a larger assumed relationship between the two countries. The other part of the relationship has been the economic one. While US policy makers can and do separate them, this is less easy for the Japanese who have posited their postwar diplomacy in economic terms.

The conditions the economic relationship has produced have resulted in a chronic US imbalance in bilateral trade. The economic shocks of 1971 and efforts to have Japan realign internal domestic conditions which favor Japanese business have not reversed this condition. Partly as a result, the dollar was again devalued in February 1973, thus forcing an approximate 34% revaluation of the Yen in little over 18 months. More significantly, the US has officially adopted an essentially adversary relationship with Japan on economic matters. In February, US chief trade negotiator William Eberle warned Japan to take action on trade problems "within 90 days or face the consequences."⁶ At the same time, the President asked for authorization to adjust tariffs as he feels necessary.

The new foreign policy charted by the United States over the last few years in response to new pressures envisions a diplomatically active multi-polar power structure as the guarantor of regional stability. Implicit in this is that a certain amount of conflict of interest is inevitable, even

⁶Seattle Times (February 11, 1973), p. A11.

desirable, in efforts at maintaining stability. In this shifting multi-polar world, the status of the Japan-US relationship will never be certain. Yet, from the Japanese point of view, the stability of this relationship has been assumed. Her entire postwar defense and security policies have been postulated on this premise.

In conclusion, it seems appropriate to look again at Ambassador Reischauer's statement that the greatest shock would be not to treat Japan as an equal. United States policy in the last 10 months has not been doing this. (In fact, it has been directed toward the opposite goal.) But, given the assumptions forced upon the Japanese by the vagrancies of history and politics, the view from Tokyo most likely is that we are.

Appendix A

THE SELF DEFENSE FORCES

The Self Defense Forces are organized in three branches (ground, maritime and air) within the Japan Defense Agency. By law, the Prime Minister is Commander in Chief. Subject to his command and supervision, the Defense Agency is run by a Director General. The Director General exercises his authority through the uniformed chiefs of staff. Unlike the prewar army, civilian authority over the SDF is complete and within the Defense Agency no uniformed officers occupy a position higher than section chief.

The strength of the SDF grew steadily during the period 1954 to 1958 and has since leveled off. Actual strength has run about 90 percent of authorized. The following table provides statistics for 1954 to 1970:

Authorized and Actual Personnel¹ In Self-Defense Forces, 1954-1970

Totals for SDF

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1954	152,095	111,177	73.0
1955	179,737	156,834	87.2
1956	197,182	181,681	92.2
1957	204,105	191,854	94.0
1958	222,102	207,803	93.5
1959	230,935	214,682	93.0
1960	230,934	206,001	89.2
1961	242,009	209,015	86.4
1962	243,923	215,649	88.4
1963	243,923	212,904	87.3
1964	246,094	216,268	87.9
1965	246,094	225,450	91.6
1966	246,094	226,280	92.1
1967	250,372	231,436	92.4
1968	250,372	234,935	93.8
1969	258,074	235,564	91.3
1970	258,074	231,405	89.7

¹ Emmerson, p. 134.

Japanese defense expenditures have been moderate in absolute terms and relatively low in terms of percentage of Gross National Product and budget. Figures for the period 1960 to 1971 are tabulated below:

Japanese Defense Expenditures (Unit \$1 million) ²				
Year	Expenditure	Percentage of GNP	Percentage of National Income	Percentage of Budget
1960	444.0		1.34	9.07
1962	606.3	1.01	1.24	8.34
1963	687.5	1.00	1.24	8.10
1964	780.0	0.98	1.24	8.41
1965	848.3	0.97	1.22	8.16
1966	958.6	0.94	1.18	7.71
1967	1,075.0	0.90	1.12	7.44
1968	1,171.6	0.80	1.05	7.13
1969	1,374.7	0.84	1.06	7.14
1970	1,581.0	0.79	0.99	7.16
1971	1,863.6	0.80		7.13

As can be seen by these figures, although the defense budget has been falling as a percentage of both GNP and National income, the actual dollar outlay has been doubling approximately every four years.

The SDF is equipped with modern first line conventional equipment. As of November 1970, major weapons systems included:

SDF Weapons Inventory³

Branch	Equipment	Quantity
Ground	Tanks	709
	Armored cars	605
	Field Artillery	900
	Self propelled artillery	444
	Model 30 rocket launchers	25
	HAWK missiles	65
	Fixed wing AC	133
	Helicopters	219

²James H. Buck, "Japan's Defense Options for the 1970's," Asian Survey, X No. 10 (October 1970), p. 892 and Emmerson, p. 138.

³Sinohara Hiroshi, "National Defense," Japan Quarterly, XVIII No. 2 (April-June, 1971), p. 157 and Emmerson, p. 144.

Maritime	Escorts	30
	Submarines	10
	Others	157
	S2F	42
	P2V-7	51
	P2J	10
	Helicopters	63
Air	F104J	192
	F86F	287
	Others	446
	Helicopters	36
	NIKE missile launchers	102

Japan is currently producing almost all the material needs of the SDF in house. Major weapons systems such as the Type 61 tank, PS-1 seaplane, escort vessels, submarines and the supersonic XT-2 trainer are being produced from domestic designs. Japanese industry is producing the F-104J fighter (now phased out), HAWK and NIKE missiles and the BADGE air Defense System under license. Recent licensing agreements will permit the F-4 fighter to be produced domestically.

The current fourth defense buildup plan (1972-76) announced in October 1970 is estimated to run approximately \$16.7 billion over the five year period. This is about 2.2 times the total cost of the third (1967-71) plan. Under the plan, personnel strength will remain essentially unchanged. The GSDF will have a total of 990 tanks, 270 more armored cars and 230 more helicopters. The ASDF will replace its older fighters with six squadrons of F-4EJ fighters. A major update of the MSDF is contemplated. Nineteen more escorts will be procured, including 2 helicopter carriers; 9 more submarines will also be authorized for construction. Total tonnage at the end of the buildup will be 250,000 tons.⁴

⁴Asian Almanac, (November 20, 1971), p. 4890.

Appendix B

CHRONOLOGY

1945	August 14	Japan accepts conditions of Potsdam Declaration
	September 2	Instrument of Surrender signed
	September 26	Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan announced
1946	February 11	South Sakhalin and Kuriles incorporated into Region of Khabarovsk
1947	May 3	New Constitution becomes effective
	August 15	Limited private trade permitted by SCAP
1950	June 22, 24	Discussions with U.S. representatives over Peace Treaty
	June 25	Korean War begins
	July 8	SCAP directs formation of National Police Reserve
1951	January 25	Discussions over Peace Treaty resume
	September 8	49 nations sign multilateral peace treaty with Japan; bilateral security treaty signed
	December 24	"Yoshida letter" re China sent
1952	January 19	ROK announces Rhee Line
	February 15	Negotiations open with ROK for normalization of relations
	April 28	Peace Treaty signed with Republic of China, San Francisco multilateral peace treaty and bilateral security treaty enter into force
	May 29	Japan admitted to International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction
	December 26	Barter trade with PRC begins
1954	March 8	Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed
	July	Safety Force reorganized into Self Defense Forces
1955	June 1	Negotiations with USSR for Peace Treaty begin
1956	October 19	Peace Agreement with Soviet Union signed
	December 18	Japan admitted to United Nations
1958	March 4	4th Private Trade Agreement with PRC
	September 11	Agreement reached with U.S. to revise Security Treaty
1960	January 19	Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed
	May 19	Treaty ratified in Diet (May-June riots)
	July 19	Ikeda replaces Kishi; "low posture" in international affairs adopted

1961	April 4	DPRK resident repatriation begins
1962	November 9	L-T Trade Memorandum signed
1963	August 14	Japan signs Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
	August 20	Export of Vinylon plant to PRC approved
	December 30	Nationalists recall Charge d'Affairs
1964	May 30	Yoshida letter re Export-Import credits
	November	Ikeda succeeded by Sato; Japan adopts "higher posture" in international affairs
1965	December 8	Treaty on basic relations with ROK ratified
1969	November 21	Nixon-Sato joint communique and Sato Press Club speech
1970	February 3	Japan signs NPT
	March 15	Expo 70 opens in Osaka
	June 22	Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security automatically extended
	October 20	White Paper on Defense issued; 4th Defense Plan announced
1971	June 17	Agreement on reversion of Ryukuys reached with U.S.
	July 17	U.S. announces President will visit PRC
	August 15	U.S. imposes 10 percent surcharge on imports; floats dollar
	October	Japan supports U.S. efforts to seat PRC in U.N. while retaining Taiwan seat; effort partially successful
	October 15	U.S.-Japan Textile Agreement (immediate 30% cut in exports)
1972	May 15	Ryukyu and Diato Islands rever to Japanese administration

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